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ABSTRACT 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 
Ateş, R. Deniz 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
September 2004 
This thesis describes and explains the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) with special reference to Turkey’s leadership. The significance of Turkey’s 
leadership, organization and activities of ISAF will be explained alongside the events 
led to the establishment of ISAF, its history, mission, and competences. After the 
U.S.-led multinational operation defeated the Taliban regime and damaged Al Qaeda 
heavily, the maintenance of security and the reconstruction of Afghanistan were vital 
in order to prevent revitalization of the broken link between Afghanistan and 
international terrorism. As a part of the UN state-building activities in Afghanistan, to 
assist the Afghan authorities in the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding 
areas, the UN Security Council authorized ISAF, initially led by Great Britain. After 
September 11, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against 
terrorism and she, being a country that suffered from terrorism for years, supported 
fully all the counter-terrorism activities. Turkey actively participated in ISAF, and 
when the British mandate was over, she took over the command of ISAF. Turkey was 
a perfect choice to lead ISAF since she had an Islamic population with a secular and 
democratic government and was one of the few countries whose forces were capable 
of coping with this kind of mission. By assuming the command of ISAF, Turkey has 
demonstrated her determination to fight against terrorism once more. During her 
leadership, ISAF operated efficiently and the stability and security in Kabul and 
surrounding areas improved gradually. 
Keywords: Peace operations, ISAF, Turkey’s leadership, United States, September 
11, Afghanistan, NATO, UN, Al Qaeda, Taliban. 
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ÖZET 
ULUSLARARASI GÜVENLİK YARDIM KUVVETİ 
Ateş, R. Deniz 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
Eylül 2004 
Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin liderlik sürecine özel ağırlık vererek Uluslararası 
Güvenlik Yardım Kuvveti (UGYK)’ni tanımlamış ve izah etmiştir. UGYK’nin 
kurulmasına sebep olan olaylar ile UGYK’nin tarihi, görev ve yetkilerinin yanısıra 
Türkiye’nin liderliğinin önemi, UGYK’nin organizasyonu ve faaliyetleri izah 
edilmiştir. A.B.D. önderliğindeki çokuluslu operasyon Taliban rejimini devirip El 
Kaide’yi ağır bir şekilde yıprattıktan sonra, güvenliğin sürdürülmesi ve Afganistan’ın 
yeniden yapılandırılması, Afganistan ile uluslararası terörizm arasındaki kopmuş olan 
bağın yeniden kurulmasını engellemek açısından önemliydi. BM’in Afganistan’da 
devletin tesisi faaliyetlerinin bir parçası olarak, BM Güvenlik Konseyi, Afgan 
yetkililere Kabil ve çevresinde güvenliğin idamesinde yardımcı olmak maksadıyla, ilk 
olarak İngiltere tarafından yönetilen UGYK’ni yetkilendirmiştir. 11 Eylül’den sonra, 
Türkiye terörizme karşı mücadelede önemli bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmış ve yıllardır 
terörizmden çekmiş bir ülke olarak terörizmle mücadele faaliyetlerini bütünüyle 
desteklemiştir. Türkiye UGYK’ne aktif olarak katkıda bulunmuş ve İngiltere’nin 
görev süresi dolduktan sonra UGYK’nin komutanlığını devralmıştır. Laik ve 
demokratik bir yönetimle idare edilen müslüman bir nüfusa sahip olması ve silahlı 
kuvvetleri bu tip bir görevin üstesinden gelebilecek az sayıda ülkeden biri olması 
sebebiyle Türkiye UGYK’ne komuta etmek için mükemmel bir seçimdi. Türkiye 
UGYK’nin komutasını üstlenerek terörizmle mücadeledeki kararlılığını bir kez daha 
göstermiştir. Türkiye’nin liderliği altında UGYK etkin bir şekilde faaliyet göstermiş 
ve Kabil ve çevresinde güvenlik ve istikrar giderek iyileşmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Operasyonları, UGYK, Türkiye’nin liderliği, A.B.D., 11 
Eylül, Afganistan, NATO, BM, El Kaide, Taliban. 
 
 v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
First of all, I would like to thank all academic and administrative staff of 
Bilkent University and of the International Relations Department in particular for 
sharing their knowledge and views throughout the courses. 
 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ali L. 
Karaosmanoğlu, who supervised me throughout this study, and whose knowledge and 
experience have been most useful during the conduct of the thesis.  
 
I am also deeply grateful to Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı and Asst. Prof. Gülgün 
Tuna for their valuable comments and for spending their valuable time to read and 
review my thesis. 
 
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my wife for her 
support, encouragement and sustained patience during this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………......……………… iii 
ÖZET ………………………………………………………………………………. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………………………………….……………. v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………………………...… vi 
LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………..……... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………………………………… x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………...……….……… xi 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ………………………………..………………… 1 
CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) .. 7 
2.1 Events Leading to the Creation of ISAF ..……………..……….…….…… 7 
2.1.1 September 11 Terrorist Attacks and International Response…......…. 7 
2.1.2 US-Led Operation in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom ... 10 
2.1.3 Efforts for the Establishment of a Post-Taliban Government ……... 13 
2.1.4 Bonn Agreement …………………………...…………….……...… 14 
2.2 Establishment of ISAF …………………...………….……………...…… 17 
2.2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 ……………….…...………. 18 
2.2.2 Military Technical Agreement …………………………...……...… 19 
2.3 A Brief History of ISAF ………………..………….……….…………… 20 
2.4 Role in Relation to Other Military and Political Efforts in Afghanistan ... 25 
2.5 Mission of ISAF …………………………………………………….…… 27 
2.5.1 Tasks …………………………...…………………….……………. 28 
 vii
2.5.2 Area of Responsibility …………………...…………………….….. 30 
2.6 Organization of ISAF ………………………………………….……….... 31 
2.6.1 Force Composition …………………………………….…...……… 31 
2.6.2 Command and Control Structure ………………………………….. 35 
2.7 Competences of ISAF …………………...………..…….…….…………. 37 
2.8 Finance of ISAF ……………………...…………….………….………… 38 
CHAPTER III: TURKEY’S LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF ІІ) ………………………………………………… 40 
3.1 Turkey and Peace Operations ……………..…………….……………..... 40 
3.2 The Road to Turkey’s Leadership of ISAF ………………………...….… 44 
3.2.1 The September 11 and Turkey …….....………………...…..……… 44 
3.2.2 Turkish-Afghan Relations …………………………………..…...… 46 
3.2.3 Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF І ………………………………...… 47 
3.2.4 Turkey: A Perfect Choice to lead ISAF …………………………… 48 
3.2.5 Turkey’s Motivations ………………………………………….…... 49 
3.2.6 Turkey’s Hesitations ...……………………………….……..……... 50 
3.3 Transfer of Authority from Great Britain to Turkey …............………….. 53 
3.4 The Organization of ISAF ІІ ………………………………...……………54  
3.4.1 ISAF ІІ Task Organization ………………………………………… 54 
3.4.2 Command and Control Structure ……………………………….…. 54 
3.4.3 Force Composition ………………………………………………… 56 
3.4.4 Area of Responsibility …………………………………………….. 58 
3.4.5 Deployment of ISAF II ……………………………………………. 58 
 viii
3.5 The Activities of ISAF II ……………………………………...………… 59 
3.5.1 Security Issues …………………………………………………….. 59 
3.5.1 Information and Psychological Operations ……………………...… 61 
3.5.1 Communication and Information Systems ………………………… 62 
3.5.1 Logistics Support …………………………………….……………. 63 
3.5.1 CIMIC Issues ……………………………………………………… 64 
3.5.1 Training Issues …………………………………………………….. 66 
3.6  Relations with Local Population, Afghan Authorities, NGOs and UN 
Agencies .....................................................................................………... 67 
3.7  Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF Ш and ISAF ІV ……………………….. 69 
3.8  Lessons learned ...………………………………………………………...69 
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION ……………………………………………..…... 74 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………...… 79 
APPENDICES 
 A. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN ...................................................................... 88 
 B. KEY LEADERS: AREAS OF CONTROL .............................................. 89 
 C. BONN AGREEMENT ............................................................................. 90 
 D. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1386 .................................. 91 
 E. MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ............................................. 94 
 E. PHOTOGRAPHS ................................................................................... 103 
 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1. ISAF Leadership Phases ...…………………………………………….…........... 25 
2. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 7 March 2002 ...……………................. 32 
3. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 31 July 2002 ...…………………........... 33 
4. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 11 August 2003 ……………................. 33 
5. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 29 March 2004 …...……………........... 34 
6. ISAF II Troops Contributing Nations ………………………………...………… 57 
7. ISAF II Force Composition …………………………………………………….. 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
1. Bonn Process ...…………...................................................................................... 16 
2. The Components of ISAF ..................................................................................... 35 
3. Basic Command and Control Structure of ISAF …………….............................. 36 
4. ISAF II Task Organization ...……………………….…….................................... 55 
5. ISAF II Chain of Command …………………………………………………….. 56 
6. ISAF II Area of Responsibility ………………………………………...……….. 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AFNORTH  : Allied Forces North Europe 
ANA   : Afghan National Army  
AOCC  : Afghanistan Operation Coordination Center 
AOR   : Area of Responsibility 
APOD   : Air Point of Disembarkation 
BLACKSEAFOR : Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
CENTCOM  : Central Command 
CIMIC  : Civil Military Cooperation 
COMISAF  : Commander of ISAF 
DDR   : Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
EOD   : Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
EU   : European Union 
FMG   : Financial Management Group 
HQ   : Headquarters 
IA   : Interim Administration 
IFOR   : Implementation Force 
IMF   : International Monetary Fund 
ISAF   : International Security Assistance Force 
JCB   : Joint Coordination Body 
KFOR  : Kosovo Force 
KIA   : Kabul International Airport 
KMNB  : Kabul Multinational Brigade 
MNMCC  : Multinational Movement Coordination Center 
MOU   : Memorandum of Understanding 
MTA   : Military Technical Agreement 
NA   : Northern Alliance 
NATO  : North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 xii
NGOs   : Nongovernmental Organizations 
OEF   : Operation Enduring Freedom 
OSCE   : Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PfP   : Partnership for Peace 
PRTs   : Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
ROE   : Rules of Engagement 
SEEBRIG  : Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force 
SFOR   : Stabilization Force 
SHAPE  : Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
TA   : Transitional Administration 
TCNs   : Troop Contributing Nations 
TIPH   : Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
UK   : United Kingdom 
UN   : United Nations 
UNAMA  : United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
UNIKOM  : United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
UNIIMOG  : United Nations Iraq-Iran Observer Group 
UNOMIG  : United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
UNOSOM  : United Nations Operation in Somalia 
UNPROFOR  : United Nations Protection Force 
UNTAET  : United Nations 
U.S.   : United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The necessity of international peace and security has been a concern of 
humankind for generations. When the League of Nations was established in the 
1920s, international peace became a pressing goal for world leaders. The preamble to 
the Covenant of the League of Nations identifies the goal of promoting international 
cooperation and achieving international peace and security. But in practice, this goal 
could not be achieved.  
After the dissolution of the League of Nations, states did not relinquish 
concern for the maintenance of peace, especially after the horrors of the Second 
World War. A new institution named the United Nations (UN) was established.  The 
birth of the UN put maintenance of international peace and security at the forefront 
of the agenda of the states, according to the expressed aim of its Charter. 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of a bipolar world made it impossible for the UN to 
play an effective role. During the Cold War, the UN developed the format for 
traditional peacekeeping, which served the United Sates (U.S.) and Soviet desires to 
avoid direct clashes of arms in the regions of tension.1 The main purpose of these 
traditional peacekeeping operations was to localize the conflicts in those regions, and 
                                                 
1 William J. Durch, 1996, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s”, in William J. 
Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of 1990s, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1-35. 
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so prevent the conflicts from turning into confrontation between the “Great Powers.” 
Traditional peacekeeping forces were usually small and played a very limited role.  
With the end of the Cold War, the international community has increasingly 
come to expect the UN to take greater initiative in maintaining peace and security. 
The UN Security Council has responded to this challenge by launching a number of 
peace operations to contain and resolve conflicts. Indeed, the peacekeeping 
operations have become a major field of UN activity. The end of the Cold War also 
signaled a new role for the UN in the era of state building. Since most of the places 
where the UN intervened had stateless societies, the UN’s mission was to construct 
the state apparatus from the ground up. 
Terrorism, whether carried out individually or collectively, poses one of the 
greatest threats to international peace and security. The terrorist attacks perpetrated 
against the U.S. on September 11 have demonstrated the level of threat that terrorism 
poses to humankind and underlined the need for international solidarity and 
concerted action in the global fight against terrorism. After the terrorist attacks 
occurred in the U.S., the relationship between these attacks and the Al Qaeda 
operating in Afghanistan has come to light. Because the Taliban regime closely 
associated with Al Qaeda and because it was allowing Afghanistan to be used as a 
base for terrorism, a US-led multinational operation was carried out against 
Afghanistan. As a result of this operation, the Taliban regime collapsed and Al 
Qaeda was heavily damaged; however, there was a high probability that terrorists 
would continue their activities in Afghanistan because of the security gap. In order to 
prevent the broken link between Afghanistan and international terrorism from being 
established once again, security and reconstruction of Afghanistan were vital. 
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Without security, nation-building and development stand little chance of 
success and terror cannot be controlled unless order is built in the anarchic zones 
where terrorists find shelter. In Afghanistan, this implies creating a state strong 
enough to keep Al Qaeda from returning. To maintain basic security throughout their 
country, newly established governments within unstable societies need outside 
support. Preventing anarchy requires well-armed and well-planned peace operations 
as a sign from the international community that the world is watching and ready to 
intervene to ensure stability. Robust peace operations permit humanitarian aid to get 
where it is needed, allow economies to start functioning again, and give governments 
the time they need to gain the people’s confidence.2 
The end of the Cold War enabled the UN to authorize peacekeeping 
missions commanded by a single state or coalition. Previously, lightly armed troops 
led by officers from disinterested nations under UN command carried out most 
peacekeeping operations. In 1990s, however, the US led a UN-authorized mission in 
Haiti, Australia led one in East Timor, and NATO continues to lead missions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. These new generation of missions had political backing they 
needed to make them much more effective than UN-commanded missions.  
After the Taliban regime had collapsed, the UN immediately began its state 
building activities in Afghanistan. As a part of these activities, in December 2001, 
the UN Security Council authorized a multinational force – International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) – to assist the interim Afghan government in the 
maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas. 
Turkey’s policy has always been to integrate with the community of the 
Western states and the ideals of the UN. To this end, Turkey has supported peace 
                                                 
2 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, “Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in 
Afghanistan,” The Washington Quarterly 26(1): 35-52. 
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initiatives by the UN, NATO and other regional organizations in order to prevent 
regional and ethnic conflicts. She has the second largest army in NATO and valuable 
experience in peace operations; its contribution to the UN peace operations increased 
in the post-Cold War era. Over the past decade, Turkish troops have deployed to 
Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Turkey emerged as one of the 
leading actors in the fight against terrorism. She supported the international coalition 
against Taliban and Al Qaeda. When the Taliban rule came to an end, it became 
possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country. Although not able 
to make a significant contribution in terms of financial and economic reconstruction 
aid, Turkey actively participated in this endeavor. Moreover, when the British 
mandate is over in June 2002, Turkey took over the command of ISAF. It was the 
first time the Turkish Military assumed full command of a multinational force. The 
Turkish army is regarded as a considerable regional force, but leadership of ISAF 
would further its claim to a greater role outside its immediate environment. It was 
also an important opportunity for the Turkish Army to prove its professionalism in 
peace operations. 
In this study, the main focus will be the analysis of ISAF and Turkey’s 
leadership. The purpose of this study is not to make value judgments, but merely to 
describe, understand and explain. The study will certainly require the description of 
events that led to the establishment of ISAF, and Turkey’s leadership role. For this 
purpose, this study will attempt to provide answers to the questions stated below: 
• Which events led to the establishment of ISAF and how has it evolved 
so far? 
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• What is the mission of ISAF and how has it been organized to achieve 
its mission? 
• What were Turkey’s motivations in accepting the command of ISAF 
and what was the significance of Turkey’s leadership? 
• Why did Turkey hesitate later while she was so keen on leading ISAF 
beforehand? 
• How was ISAF organized under Turkey’s leadership? 
• What were the activities of ISAF during Turkey’s leadership? 
• Which lessons can be taken from the phase of Turkey’s ISAF 
leadership? 
To find answers to these questions, in the second chapter, the events 
leading to the establishment of ISAF, a brief history, mission, competences, 
organization and finance of ISAF and its role in relation to other political and 
military efforts in Afghanistan will be described beforehand in order to provide a 
better understanding of Turkey’s leadership and the operation itself. 
In the third chapter, Turkey’s approach to peace operations, the road to 
Turkey’s leadership of ISAF, the organization and activities of ISAF under Turkey’s 
leadership, relations with Afghan government, civil population, the UN agencies and 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) will be examined. At the end of this part, 
lessons drawn from ISAF operation will be formulated. 
In conclusion, a concise overall evaluation will be presented and some 
research topics will be recommended for future research. 
The significance of this study arises from the fact that neither ISAF nor 
Turkey’s leadership has so far been researched from a scholarly perspective. There 
are no books on these subjects, but only a few articles. Therefore, this thesis was 
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written mostly on the basis of first-hand material. The main sources come from the 
UN Security Council resolutions, reports from the lead nations to the Secretary-
General on the activities of ISAF, briefing papers presented by the commander and 
deputy commander of ISAF, press statements, some other official documents, and 
interviews. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 
 
(ISAF) 
 
 
 
2.1 Events Leading to the Creation of ISAF 
2.1.1 September 11 Terrorist Attacks and International Response 
On September 11, four commercial airline jets on U.S. domestic routes were 
hijacked and used in suicide bombings. The planes were flown into the buildings 
symbolizing the U.S. economy and military. These terrorist attacks shocked the 
international community more than any other event in 2001.  
At 08:45 A.M. local time, a passenger jet crashed into the north tower of 
World Trade Center in New York. 18 minutes later, a second aircraft was flown into 
the south tower. The impact of the two aircraft and subsequent fires caused the 
collapse of both towers at approximately 10:00 A.M. At around 9:45 A.M., a third 
hijacked aircraft was flown into the Pentagon in Washington DC causing a part of it 
to collapse. Those incidents were followed by the crash of another aircraft into the 
Pennsylvania countryside at around 10:10 A.M. The death tolls in these incidents 
were approximately three thousand, “the worst casualties experienced in the United 
States in a single day since the American Civil War.”3 
                                                 
3 Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United Sates Relating to 
International Law”, The American Journal of International Law 96(1): 237-255. See also “U.S. and 
Allied Casualties: Sept. 11, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Anti-Terrorist Campaign” for the 
casualties on September 11, available at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/casualties-pr.cfm>. 
 
8 
 
As for the responsibility for the terrorist attacks, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the U.S. made it known immediately that Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization 
based in Afghanistan, and its leader Usama bin Laden carried out the attacks.4 Even 
prior to September 11, Al Qaeda had been suspected of involvement in several 
terrorist attacks against the United States. However, Usama bin Laden himself did 
not expressly claim responsibility for the attacks.5 
The U.S. regarded the September 11 incidents as comparable to a military 
attack.6 Whether they do indeed constitute an armed attack is an important question, 
as Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the “inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations.” The U.S. has relied on the right of self-defense to justify its military action 
after September 11.7 In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration 
turned its attention to waging a war against terrorism. First, on the domestic front, the 
administration sought and received a joint resolution from the Congress, authorizing 
use of military force. In the language of the resolution: 
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, 
or persons.8 
Second, the U.S. sought and received enormous international support. North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the UN, and 
                                                 
4 On October 4, 2001, the U.K. released a document claiming the responsibility for the terrorist 
attacks. See “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001”, 
available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.html>. 
5 Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United Sates Relating to 
International Law”, The American Journal of International Law 96(1): 237-255. 
6 Colin Mclnness, 2002, “A Different Kind of War? 11 September and the United States’ Afghan 
War”, available at <http://www.ex.ac.uk/~tgfarrel/courses/McInnesfinal.pdf>. 
7 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Christopher Greenwood, 2002, “International Law and the 
War against Terrorism”, International Affairs, 78(2): 301-318. 
8 Michael M. Collier, 2003, “The Bush Administration’s Reaction to September 11: A Multilateral 
Voice or A Multilateral Veil?”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 21: 715-730. 
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numerous heads of state responded with support for the U.S. and its war against 
terrorism. On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council, the governing body of 
NATO, released a statement announcing,  
If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United 
States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.9 
On October 2, after being briefed on the known facts by the U.S., the Council 
determined the facts were “clear and compelling” and that “the attacks against the 
United States on 11 September were directed from abroad and shall therefore be 
regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”10 It was the 
first time in the history of the Alliance that Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty 
was invoked. NATO’s invocation of Article V did not institute direct military action; 
however, it facilitated the building of a military coalition under the U.S. leadership.11 
 The EU also declared its full solidarity with the U.S. It issued a declaration 
from the extraordinary meeting of the General Affairs Council on September 12, 
indicating that the EU members would work together to combat terrorism.12 In a 
ministerial statement on September 20, 2001, the U.S. and the EU outlined several 
key areas for future cooperation in their effort to eliminate international terrorism. 
The statement said, "The U.S. and the EU are committed to enhancing security 
measures, legislation and enforcement” and added, “We will mount a 
                                                 
9 NATO Press Release (2001)124, September 12, 2001, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council”, 
available at < http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm >. 
10 NATO Speech, October 2, 2001, “Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson”, 
available at < http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm>. 
11 Michael M. Collier, 2003, “The Bush Administration’s Reaction to September 11: A Multilateral 
Voice or A Multilateral Veil?”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 21: 715-730. 
12 EU Declaration, September 12, 2001, “Terrorism in the US”, Special Council Meeting-General 
Affairs, available at <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=168>. 
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comprehensive, systematic and sustained effort to eliminate international terrorism--
its leaders, its actions, its networks.”13 
As for the UN, on September 12, the Security Council, “recognizing the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the 
Charter”, unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 condemning “the horrifying terrorist 
attacks” and regarding these attacks “as a threat to international peace and 
security.”14 Further, on September 28, the Security Council unanimously adopted, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1373, which contained specific 
measures against the financing of terrorism. It called on member states to implement 
comprehensive measures to fight against terrorism, and called for expanded 
information sharing among member states. Resolution 1373 further required Member 
States to refrain from allowing their territory to be used in support of terrorist actions 
or to recruit members of terrorist organizations. Additionally, it established a 
Security Council committee for monitoring these measures on a continuous basis.15 
 
2.1.2 The U.S.-Led Operation in Afghanistan: “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was an expectation within 
the United States for a military response. From the outset, the suspicion turned 
toward Al Qaeda, whose leadership and training bases were in Afghanistan and 
under the protection of the Taliban. As the U.S. government discovered further 
                                                 
13 The United States Mission to the European Union, September 20, 2001, “Joint US-EU Statement 
on Combating Terrorism”, available at <http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/EUResponse/092001 
USEUJoint Statement.html >. 
14 UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (S/RES/1368), September 12, 2001, para. 1. 
15 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373), September 28, 2001, para. 1-3, 6. 
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evidence16 tying the attacks to Usama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda, it turned its 
attention towards Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. The U.S. government 
demanded from the Taliban delivery to the U.S. of all the leaders of Al Qaeda, and to 
close all terrorist training camps.17 It also emphasized that those demands were not 
open to negotiation. The Taliban rejected these demands, calling for proof of Usama 
bin Laden’s involvement in the terrorist attacks.18 
With the Taliban continuing to reject its demands, the U.S. began to prepare 
for the use of armed forces in Afghanistan. On October 7, the U.S. informed the 
Security Council that it had “initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were carried 
out against the United States on September 11, 2001.” The letter went on to note that 
the U.S. Government had obtained “clear and compelling information that the Al 
Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a 
central role in these attacks” and that the U.S. Armed Forces had initiated actions 
“designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.”19  
The concept of operation, which was dubbed “Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF)”, was to “destroy the Al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with the 
illegitimate Taliban regime which was harboring and protecting the terrorists.”20 The 
U.S.-led multinational military campaign, OEF, has roughly 10,000 troops inside 
Afghanistan, as well as air support and logistics elements outside of it. 
                                                 
16 See “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001”, available 
at <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.html>. 
17 Because the United States has no diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, U.S. demands were 
communicated to the Taliban through the government of Pakistan. 
18 Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United Sates Relating to 
International Law”, The American Journal of International Law 96(1): 237-255. 
19 UN Security Council, October 7, 2001, “Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent 
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council (S/2001/946), available at <http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm>. 
20 Statement of General Tommy R. Franks (Commander in Chief, US Central Command ), February 7, 
2002, Senate Armed Services Commitee, available at  <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/ 
2002/Franks.pdf>. 
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Twenty nations including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and Norway provided troops and support.21 The operation began with 
massive aerial strikes against selected military targets and expanded to include 
political and infrastructure targets as well as Al Qaeda bases. After the Northern 
Alliance (NA) set up its offensive, the focus of the bombing campaign changed to 
disturbing the ground forces opposing the NA.22 On 9 November, the NA troops 
entered the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif. In the following days, Taliban military 
forces were collapsed in most of the country, many of them fleeing toward the 
southern city of Kandahar, where the Taliban originated. On November 13, the NA 
forces entered the capital city of Kabul. Kandahar, the last city held by the Taliban, 
succumbed to the pressure from continual Coalition bombing and ground action by 
anti-Taliban Afghan forces on December 7.23  
As a result, the Taliban was removed from power and the Al Qaeda network 
in Afghanistan was destroyed heavily. However, Coalition Forces have continued to 
locate and destroy remaining pockets of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and 
continued to search for surviving leadership.24 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Victoria K. Holt, June 2002, “Peace And Stability In Afghanistan: U.S. Goals Challenged By 
Security Gap”, Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at < http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ 
AfghanSecurityGapfactsheet_063102.pdf>. 
22 The Northern Alliance, known formally as the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of 
Afghanistan or the United Front, is a loose and constantly shifting confederation of Afghan militias 
and warlords, drawn largely from ethnic minorities who live in the north of Afghanistan. The 
Northern Alliance was composed mainly of Tajiks and Uzbeks, but did not include Pashtuns, 
Afghanistan’s main ethnic group. 
23 Colin Mclnness, 2002, “A Different Kind of War? 11 September and the United States’ Afghan 
War”, available at <http://www.ex.ac.uk/~tgfarrel/courses/McInnesfinal.pdf>. 
24 Statement of General Tommy R. Franks (Commander in Chief, US Central Command ), February 7, 
2002, Senate Armed Services Commitee, available at  <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/ 
2002/Franks.pdf>. 
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2.1.3 Efforts for the Establishment of a Post-Taliban Government 
In parallel with the advance of military operations by the U.S. and other 
forces, the international community, especially the UN, has begun to focus on the 
problems associated with creating a new political, economic, and socially viable 
state. The first step on this road was the establishment of a new broad-based Afghan 
government. 
Even before September 11, the UN had tried for a peaceful transition from 
civil war to a broad-based government in Afghanistan. These UN efforts, at times, 
appeared to make significant progress, but ceasefires and other agreements between 
the warring factions always broke down.25 The September 11 attacks and the U.S. 
military action against the Taliban introduced a new necessity, which was the search 
for a new government that might replace the Taliban. In late September 2001, 
Lakhdar Brahimi26 was brought back as the UN representative to help Afghan 
leaders arrange an alternative government. On November 12, the Foreign Ministers 
of “Six plus Two” met with Brahimi at the UN to discuss Afghanistan’s future.27 
Given the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, the Group agreed to accelerate the 
process of assembling a “multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen 
government.”28 One day later, at the meeting of the Security Council on November 
13, Brahimi outlined an approach for the creation of a transitional government and 
for the deployment of a multinational force.29  
                                                 
25 Kenneth Katzman, April 1, 2003, “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, Report for 
Congress, available at <http://carper.senate.gov/acrobat%20files/RL30588.pdf>. 
26 Brahimi, who was a former foreign minister of Algeria, worked as UN Mediator to Afghanistan 
from August 1997 to October 1999.  
27 The “Six plus Two” Group included the United States, Russia, and Afghanistan neighbors Iran, 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Turkmenistan.   
28 Declaration on the Situation in Afghanistan by the Foreign Ministers and Other Senior 
Representatives of the "Six plus Two”, November 12, 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/News/ 
dh/latest/afghan/sixplus.htm>. 
29 Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United Sates Relating to 
International Law”, The American Journal of International Law 96(1): 237-255. 
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On November 14, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1378. The 
Security Council expressed “its strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to 
establish a new and transitional administration leading to formation of a 
government…”, and affirmed that the UN should play a central role in this process. It 
also expressed its full support for Brahimi in the accomplishment of his mandate, and 
called on Afghans to cooperate with him.30 
The UN representatives led by Brahimi arrived in Kabul on November 18 to 
convince Afghan leaders to participate in talks about their country’s future. At the 
beginning, the NA leaders wanted the conference to be held in Kabul. However, with 
the pressure of the U.S., they agreed to a meeting to discuss a post-Taliban 
government in a neutral location in Europe rather than Kabul.31  
 
2.1.4 The Bonn Agreement 
From November 27 through December 5, the German city of Bonn hosted the 
UN talks on Afghanistan, to form an interim, post-Taliban administration for the 
country, and to establish a framework for its physical, political, and economic 
reconstruction. The meeting brought together the UN officials and the representatives 
of major Afghan factions to discuss the country’s future.32  
The meeting was held behind the closed doors and included a series of 
plenary talks and direct talks between the Afghan factions themselves and between 
                                                 
30 UN Security Council Resolution 1378 (S/RES/1378), 14 November 2001, para. 1-3. 
31 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12, available at <http://www.journal. 
forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no2/pdf/v4n2-p03-12_e.pdf>. 
32 Four delegations of anti-Taliban ethnic factions attended the Bonn Conference: the Northern 
Alliance; the "Cyprus group," a group of exiles with ties to Iran; the "Rome group," loyal to former 
King Mohammad Zaher Shah, who lives in exile in Rome and did not attend the meeting; and the 
"Peshawar group," a group of mostly Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan. The Northern Alliance and the 
Rome group each contributed 11 representatives to the discussion, while the Cyprus and Peshawar 
groups contributed five. See Frontline, “Filling the Vacuum: The Bonn Conference”, available at 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cindex.html >. 
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the UN representatives and the representatives of each faction. The concept of an 
international security force for Afghanistan was developed during these negotiations. 
The objective of Bonn conference was to reach a consensus on an interim 
administration and future security architecture.33 
During the first days of the conference, the delegates agreed on a road map 
for the process of forming a government. However, some disagreements occurred 
related to the multinational forces. The NA favored an all-Afghan force to provide 
security for the capital, not an outside force. The delegates of three other factions, on 
the contrary, preferred a multinational force with a UN mandate in Kabul. According 
to Maloney, these views related to the relative coercive power that the NA forces 
held in Kabul vis-à-vis the forces of other factions.  
In Afghanistan, as it is after any regime collapse, force is a prerequisite for 
political activity, therefore elements from other areas of the country included in 
an Interim Government either had to bring their own military forces to Kabul or 
find some substitute so they could protect themselves and influence political 
events on the ground. But, clearly, the NA held all the cards in Kabul and for 
the time being didn’t want to let go.34 
After some discussions, the delegates came to an agreement on December 5, 
2001. The agreement called for three major political steps. The first is the formation 
of an Interim Administration (IA) consisting of 30 members. Hamid Karzai was 
selected as the chairman of the IA in which a slight majority of the positions, 
including key posts of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior, were held by the NA. 
Second, a special 21-person commission was to be established to prepare an 
emergency “Loya Jirga”35 to be convened in six months. This body was to select a 
                                                 
33 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12, available at <http://www.journal. 
forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no2/pdf/v4n2-p03-12_e.pdf>. 
34 Ibid. See also Anthony Davis, December 19, 2001, “Stability in View”, Jane’s Defence Weekly 
36(25):17. 
35 “Loya Jirga” is a “grand council” of elders from Afghanistan’s tribes, factions, and ethnic groups, 
which is convened by the Afghan king to settle disputes, discuss social reforms, and acts as a sort of 
constitutional convention. 
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Transitional Administration (TA) to rule for a period not to exceed 24 months, at 
which time elections for a permanent government will be held. Third, no later than 
18 months after the IA assumes the power, another Loya Jirga was to be held in order 
to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan.36  
Figure 1: Bonn Process37 
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As for the security force issue, the Bonn Agreement included an annex, 
entitled “International Security Force”, which sought international help to establish 
and train Afghan national security forces. Because some time would be required for 
the new Afghan Security Forces to be fully constituted and functioning, it was 
requested “the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early 
deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. Such a force will 
assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.” Moreover, 
                                                 
36 Bonn Agreement, December 5, 2001, General Provisions, para. 1-6, available at <www.uno.de/ 
frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm>. 
37 Turkish General Staff, “Afghanistan Bilgi Dosyası (Afghanistan Information File)”. 
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the participants in the Bonn conference pledged, “to withdraw all military units from 
Kabul and other urban areas in which the UN-mandated force is deployed.” 38 
The Bonn Agreement did not mention force size, mandate, or timing 
probably because the U.S.-led campaign was continuing on the ground when the 
agreement was signed. Moreover, there were still disagreements on these issues 
between the NA leaders and the others, and more importantly, an international 
security force in Kabul meant that the NA had to cede control of capital. At the end, 
it had consented to such a force because of the pressure coming from the “Six plus 
Two” group, especially from the U.S. and Russia.39 
 
2.2 Establishment of ISAF 
Kandahar was taken and the Taliban regime collapsed one day after the Bonn 
Agreement was signed, in December 2001. This was an unexpected and early 
development. The UN Security Council quickly passed Resolution 1383, which 
endorsed the Bonn Agreement. After a force generation conference at CENTCOM, 
the UK formally offered, to the UN Security Council, to organize the International 
Security Assistance Force and act as lead nation for it. The Security Council 
accepted this offer on December 20 by adopting Resolution 1386.40  
Concurrent with this announcement, a force planning conference was held for 
possible Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on December 19, 2001.41 At this 
conference, 21 countries offered forces. The United Kingdom, after evaluating the 
offers, preferred 17 countries to deploy troops alongside the UK forces as part of 
                                                 
38 See Appendix C for that annex. 
39 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12. Se also Frontline, “Filling the Vacuum: 
The Bonn Conference”, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/ 
withus/cindex.html >. 
40 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12. 
41 Ibid. 
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ISAF. Major General John McColl, from British Army, was designated force 
commander.42  
 
2.2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 
The UK formally informed the Security Council that it was willing to become 
the initial lead nation for ISAF with a letter dated 19 December 2001 from the 
Permanent Representative of the UK to the President of the Council. According to 
the letter, the responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan resides 
with the Afghans themselves, and ISAF would assist the IA in maintaining 
security.43  
On December 20, 2001, the Security Council, determining the situation in 
Afghanistan constituted a threat to international peace and security, passed 
Resolution 1386 authorizing the establishment of the ISAF, for six months, to assist 
the IA in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas.44 It also welcomed 
the UK’s offer to take the lead in organizing and commanding ISAF.45 
Being voted unanimously, Resolution 1386 passed under chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and authorized participating countries to “take all necessary measures” 
in carrying out their responsibilities. It called on Member States to contribute 
personnel, equipment, and other resources to the Force. It also called upon ISAF to 
work in close consultation with the IA and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General.46 
                                                 
42 Geoff Honn ( The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), January 10, 2002,  “International Security 
Assistance Force for Kabul”, Statement in the House of Commons, available at 
<http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1336>. 
43 UN Security Council Press Release (SC/7248), December 20, 2001, “Security Council Authorizes 
International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan”, available at <http://www.un.org/News/ 
Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm>. 
44 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 1. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, para. 2-4. 
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Resolution 1386 also called on all Afghans to cooperate with the Force. It 
welcomed the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to “do all within 
their means and influence” to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement 
of all UN and other international personnel in Afghanistan.47 
Resolution 1386 urged the Afghans to withdraw all military units from Kabul 
in cooperation with the ISAF. Member States participating in ISAF were called on to 
help the IA in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed 
forces.48  
 
2.2.2 The Military Technical Agreement 
Major General John McColl, with a reconnaissance unit, went to Afghanistan 
to meet and determine the details of ISAF with the members of the IA.49 There 
occurred several points of disagreement. The most important issue was the size of 
ISAF. The Afghans, in particular Defense Minister General Fahim Khan, insisted on 
a force no larger than 1,000, while Western leaders wanted a force 5,000-6,000 
strong.50 They also insisted that ISAF would be restricted to a static security role, 
guarding key buildings and political figures, while patrolling the city would remain 
under the responsibility of Afghan police and military personnel.51 
 This reflected Fahim’s view that the presence of ISAF on the streets would 
undermine his control of the city. On the contrary, ISAF’s view of the task was for a 
                                                 
47 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 5. 
48 Ibid, para. 6,10. 
49 Geoff Honn ( The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), December 19, 2001,  “International 
Security Assistance Force for Kabul”, Statement in the House of Commons, available at 
<http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1298>. 
50 Daniel Smith and Rachel Stohl, December 21, 2001, “Afghanistan: Re-emergence of a State”,  
available at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/reemergence.cfm>. See also Robin Oakley (CNN’s 
European Political Editor), December 19, 2001, “Disputes Delay Afghan Peacekeepers”, available at 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/12/18/gen.peacekeeping.force>.  
51 Anthony Davis, December 19, 2001, “Stability in View”, Jane’s Defence Weekly 36(25):17. 
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force that was able to patrol freely throughout the city, in many cases as a joint 
activity with the Afghan police, but with no restriction on its freedom of movement. 
After intense negotiations, McColl and the IA signed a Military Technical 
Agreement (MTA) on January 4, 2002. The MTA set out the relationship between 
ISAF and the IA. It gave ISAF the powers it required to operate freely and without 
hindrance, and defined the legal status of ISAF, its deployment, authority, and the 
support that the IA would provide. It also specified the location of barracks in Kabul 
to which Afghan forces would be confined. Moreover, it clarified what the ISAF 
would do and where it would operate.52  
After the MTA was signed, the participation of TCNs was formalized through 
the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” in London.53 The MOU 
set out the arrangements, responsibilities, general principles, and procedures by 
which the TCNs would implement. This represented the final step in agreeing on the 
structure of ISAF for its period under UK leadership.  
 
2.3 A Brief History of ISAF 
Deployment of ISAF to Afghanistan began in early January 2002, following 
the conclusion of MTA on January 4. Initial operating capability was reached in mid-
January. ISAF declared the achievement of full operational capacity on February 18, 
2002.54 Germany assumed the command of Kabul Multinational Brigade on 19 
March, while the United Kingdom remained in place as lead nation and in command 
                                                 
52 Geoff Honn ( The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), January 10, 2002,  “ International Security 
Assistance Force for Kabul”, Statement in the House of Commons, available at <http://news.mod.uk/ 
news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1336>. 
53 Ibid. 
54 UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for 
International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)”, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 55-59, 
available at <http://www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/key-docs-sg-report.pdf>. 
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of ISAF headquarters. At the same time, the details of the handover of ISAF lead 
nation responsibility from Great Britain to Turkey were working out.55 
According to ISAF statistics, the security situation in Kabul improved 
significantly since the arrival of ISAF. Most of the population of Kabul welcomed 
the security and confidence that ISAF brought.56 The NA forces began to pull out of 
Kabul and move into the barracks, which were designated in the MTA.57 
In Geneva in April 2002, a number of nations agreed to take the lead in 
training segments of the Afghan security sector. The U.S. volunteered to train the 
Afghan military and border security service; Germany pledged to train the Afghan 
police force; Great Britain agreed to lead the counter-narcotics effort; and Italy 
volunteered to run a rule of law program. In April, the UN approved the UN 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was to oversee implementation 
of the Bonn process.58 
In April 2002, Turkey announced that it would take over the leadership of 
ISAF on certain conditions. Turkey insisted that the UN renew the ISAF mandate, 
and that the Area of Responsibility (AOR) remain limited to Kabul and its environs 
with no expansion.59 The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1413 on May 
23, 2002. This Resolution resolved to extend the authorization of the ISAF for 
Afghanistan as defined in Resolution 1386, for a period of six months beyond June 
20, 2002. The AOR remained unchanged. UN Security Council Resolution 1413 also 
transferred lead nation status for the execution of the ISAF mission from the UK to 
                                                 
55 UN Security Council, April 25, 2002, “Second Report on the Activities of International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/479)”, available at <http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/ 
D73C9ADAA9BB195EC1256BAA0040794D>. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Annex C of the MTA in Appendix E 
58 Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2002, “Views On Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and 
Statements by U.S. and International Leaders”, Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at 
<www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ViewsonAfghanistan.pdf>. 
59 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12.   
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the Republic of Turkey, for the same period of six months from June 20, 2002 to 
December 20, 2002.60  Therefore, Turkey’s lead nation responsibility of ISAF II 
started on June 20, 2002 under the command of Major General Hilmi Akın ZORLU. 
At the same time, as it had been planned at the Bonn Conference, the 
emergency Loya Jirga was opened on June 10, 2002. It ended the authority of the IA 
and selected the members of the TA, and Karzai as the chairman of it. The TA took 
office on 24 June.61  
Towards the end of Turkey’s tenure as ISAF lead nation, the search for the 
subsequent lead nation began.  In the autumn of 2002, German Defense Minister 
Peter Struck expressed the view that NATO should take over command of ISAF, 
arguing that this move would resolve logistical and communications problems and 
allow for continuity of command after the Turkish frame. From the outset, there was 
interest in Alliance circles in the idea of NATO rotating the lead nation in ISAF 
every six months. However, Germany and the Netherlands agreed to take over the 
ISAF command jointly from Turkey. For several reasons, including the fact that 
NATO still had made no decision about its involvement, it was decided that the 
Headquarters of German/Netherlands Corps deploy to Kabul to run the mission.62 
The Corps Headquarters, headed by German Lieutenant General Norbert van Heyst, 
was a multinational one. As well as German and Dutch troops, it included personnel 
from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.63 
On November 27, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1444, 
which extended the authorization of ISAF for a period of one year beyond December 
                                                 
60 UN Security Council Resolution 1413 (S/RES/1413), 23 May 2002. 
61 See Figure 1. 
62 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
Stabilization Force”, Canadian Military Journal 4(2):3-12.   
63 Mark Burgess, December 17, 2002, “CDI Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force 
(December 2002)”, Center for Defense Information (CDI), available at <http://www.cdi.org/ 
terrorism/isaf_dec02-pr.cfm>. 
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20, 2002 as defined in Resolution 1386. The mission and AOR of ISAF remained 
again unchanged. Resolution 1444 also welcomed the offer of Germany and the 
Netherlands to assume jointly the ISAF command from Turkey.64 Normally Turkey 
would have handed over the command on December 20, 2002, but Turkey’s 
leadership was extended until February 10, 2003 and Germany/Netherlands took 
over the command from Turkey on that day. 
As of April 16, 2003, NATO, which was providing 95% of the force as well 
as providing logistical and planning support, at last declared its intention to take over 
the command of ISAF. On August 11, 2003, at the end of Germany/Netherlands 
tenure, NATO formally assumed the leadership role of ISAF. It was the Alliance’s 
first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.65 In addition, Canada became the lead 
nation for the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB). Although NATO has taken the 
command of ISAF, numerous non-NATO nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
nations have continued taking part in ISAF. The NATO-led ISAF has continued to 
use the same banner and operates according to UN resolutions. NATO’s leadership 
role of ISAF has overcome the problem of a continual search for a new lead nation 
every six months. Moreover, the creation of a permanent ISAF headquarters has 
added stability, increased continuity and enabled smaller countries to play a stronger 
role within a multinational structure.66 
The North Atlantic Council has provided political direction to ISAF, in close 
consultation with non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations. Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, has assumed the strategic 
command and control and hosted the ISAF international coordination cell. 
                                                 
64 UN Security Council Resolution 1444 (S/RES/1444), November 27, 2002. 
65 NATO Briefing, August 2003, “Working to Bring Peace and Stability to Afghanistan”, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/briefing_afghanistan_01.pdf>. 
66 Ibid. 
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Underneath SHAPE, another headquarters, Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH) 
has been responsible at the operational level for manning, training, deploying and 
sustaining ISAF. AFNORTH has served as the operational command between 
SHAPE and ISAF.67 
In January 2004, NATO appointed Hikmet Çetin to the post of Senior 
Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. Hikmet Cetin is responsible for advancing 
the political-military aspects of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan and receives his 
guidance from the North Atlantic Council. He works in close coordination with the 
Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and UNAMA as well as with the Afghan 
authorities and other bodies of the international community.68 
After NATO assumed the command of ISAF, the discussions over the 
expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul accelerated. Finally, on October 13, 2003, after the 
North Atlantic Council consented to the expansion of ISAF, the UN Security Council 
approved Resolution 1510. Resolution 1510 authorized expansion of ISAF to allow 
for the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul. It also 
extended the mandate of ISAF, which was to expire on 20 December, for a period of 
an additional 12 months.69 
The expansion of ISAF to other cities of Afghanistan would become reality in 
the shape of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which had been previously 
developed by the Coalition Forces. The main purpose of the PRTs was to help in 
reconstruction by “winning hearts and minds through small projects.”70 First, the 
German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz was transferred from 
                                                 
67 “NATO and the ISAF Mission”, August 28, 2003,  available at <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/ 
structure/structure_NATOISAF.htm>. 
68 NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, “NATO in Afghanistan”, available at <http://www.nato.int/issues/ 
Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>. 
69 UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (S/RES/1510), October 13, 2003. 
70 The Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003, “Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?”, Task 
Force Report, available at <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Afghanistan_TF.pdf >. 
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Coalition Forces Command to ISAF Command on January 6, 2004. The mission of 
the Kunduz PRT was to facilitate ISAF's effort to assist the government of 
Afghanistan to extend its authority and influence, to facilitate the development of a 
stable and secure environment, and to advance security sector reform and 
reconstruction efforts within the PRT area of operations. 71  The PRT in Kunduz was 
a pilot project for further ISAF expansion. Other PRTs under ISAF Command have 
been planned.  
In short, the leadership of ISAF has gone through a number of phases, 
referred to as ISAF I, II, III, and IV. The first lead nation to command ISAF was the 
United Kingdom. Turkey followed it, and then Germany and the Netherlands jointly 
assumed the command. Finally, NATO assumed the command for an indefinite 
period. There is not a fixed end date for ISAF, and it will be in existence until the 
accomplishment of the Bonn process.72  
Table 1: ISAF Leadership Phases 
 LEAD NATION TIMEFRAME 
ISAF I United Kingdom December 2001--20 June 2002 
ISAF II Turkey 20 June 2002--10 February 2003 
ISAF III Germany/Netherlands 10 February 2003--11 August 2003 
ISAF IV NATO 11 August 2003-- 
 
 
2.4 Role of ISAF in Relation to Other Military and Political Efforts in 
Afghanistan 
ISAF operates separately from other forces operating in Afghanistan under 
OEF. The character of OEF is different from that of ISAF. OEF is best described as a 
                                                 
71 NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, “NATO in Afghanistan”, available at <http://www.nato.int/ 
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combat-focused mission aiming to counter Taliban and Al Qaeda threats. 
Nevertheless, the end state for both missions is the same: to bring peace and stability 
to Afghanistan under the auspices of an elected and democratic government. 
Therefore, ISAF and OEF have to work together to achieve their objectives. To 
prevent overlap between ISAF and OEF forces and for reasons of effectiveness, it 
has been agreed that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) activities would take 
precedence and CENTCOM would have operational authority over ISAF.73 In 
addition, the OEF forces have provided logistical, communications, and intelligence 
support to ISAF, and have been ready to act as a quick-reaction force to rescue ISAF 
units if they get into trouble.74 
ISAF is a UN authorized mission, but it is neither a UN mission nor is it led 
by the UN. It is a “coalition of the willing” and has been deployed under the 
authorization of the UN Security Council. Therefore, it operates separately from the 
UNAMA. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 called upon ISAF to 
work in close consultation with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, who leads UNAMA.75 
Moreover, a “Joint Coordination Body (JCB)” was set up on January 13, 
2002 to ensure close cooperation between the IA, ISAF and the UN on matters 
related to the security issues. The JCB has met on a bimonthly basis, and included 
the Ministers of Defense and Interior of Afghanistan, the COMISAF and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General.76  
 
                                                 
73 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the President of the Security Council dated 
19 December 2001(S/2001/1217), cited in UNSC Resolution 1386. 
74 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, “Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping 
in Afghanistan,” The Washington Quarterly 26(1): 35-52. 
75 UNSC Resolution 1386, December 20, 2001, para. 4. 
76 UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for 
International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)”, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 60, available at 
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2.5 Mission of ISAF 
Through Resolution 1386, the Security Council, “recognizing that the 
responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country 
resides with the Afghan themselves”, authorized ISAF to “assist Afghan Interim 
Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that 
the Afghan Interim Administration as well as the personnel of the United Nations can 
operate in a secure environment.”77 Further, the Security Council called on the states 
participating in ISAF to “provide assistance to help Afghan Interim Authority in the 
establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.”78 
As stated in Resolution 1386 and in the Bonn Agreement, ensuring security 
throughout Afghanistan is ultimately under the responsibility of the Afghans 
themselves. The role of ISAF is to “assist” the IA and its successor, not to replace its 
role as the government and undertake its responsibility for security. As time moves 
on, the Afghan government will build up its own new security forces, and ISAF will 
help that process. Therefore, ISAF is a temporary force until the creation of a 
national army and police force. 
As Hamid Karzai explained, the Afghans have seen the presence of ISAF as 
“a guarantee against interference, as a guarantee for the commitment of the 
international community, and as a guarantee internally within Afghanistan that they 
would be given a sense of security.”79 
According to Barnett Rubin, who has written widely on Afghanistan and who 
was a consultant to the UN team during the Bonn conference, ISAF is a security 
assistance mission and not a peacekeeping mission. In the words of Rubin; 
                                                 
77 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 1. 
78 Ibid, para. 10. 
79 Online Newshour, January 9, 2002, “Prospects for Peacekeeping”, available at <http://www.pbs. 
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…the mission of ISAF is not to keep the peace…this force is not sent there to 
enforce or to monitor an agreement among the warring parties. This force is 
sent there with the agreement of essentially the victorious Afghan party, which 
is a coalition, in order to assure the political neutrality of the capital and to 
maintain security there so the government can go about its business, but also 
very importantly so that people from all over the country can come there in 
delegations, meet people from all parts of the government, and carry out the 
necessary preparations for holding the Loya Jirga or grand council, which will 
take place there in June. Again the role of the security assistance force, which is 
what rather than a peacekeeping force, will be important in assuring the 
neutrality of the capital when that very important gathering takes place.80  
Although Rubin does not consider ISAF as a peacekeeping operation, the tasks of 
ISAF mentioned by him have been usually included in peace operations undertaken 
in the post-Cold War era.  
 
2.5.1 Tasks 
The MTA designated a number of probable tasks for ISAF: 
• Conduct protective patrolling in AOR. 
• Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures. 
• Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction. 
• Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan 
security forces.81 
So far, ISAF has conducted patrols in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a 
third of these patrols have been carried out jointly with the Kabul Police.82 ISAF has 
assisted the restructuring of a new Afghan National Army (ANA), providing advice 
and allowing the Afghan authorities to direct development, and ultimately offering 
training support. It has also proposed and supported the development of new Kabul 
police structures. It trained first units of the new ANA and Afghan Police. ISAF has 
also contributed to the progressive consolidation of Afghan national institutions. It 
has contributed to strengthening the IA/TA in Kabul, while providing a security 
                                                 
80 Online Newshour, January 9, 2002, “Prospects for Peacekeeping”, available at <http://www.pbs. 
org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june02/peacekeeping_1-09.html >. 
81 See Appendix E. 
82 NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, “NATO in Afghanistan”, available at <http://www.nato.int/ 
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blanket to the UN agencies and the NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction.83  
However, concerning ANA training, most activities were conducted by the 
U.S., Great Britain, and France outside of the ISAF framework, though ISAF assisted 
with its resources when possible. Moreover, Germany committed itself to assisting 
the training of Afghan police force, a mission again quite separate from ISAF joint 
patrolling system.84 
Since October 2003, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) process has been continuing in Afghanistan. The Afghan government runs the 
DDR process with the assistance of UNAMA and ISAF. Up to March 13, 2004, in 
the KABUL area, 1,870 Afghan former combatants and soldiers were demobilized.85 
Simultaneously, ISAF has also been supporting the Afghan Ministry of Defense in its 
efforts to carry forward the cantonment of heavy weapons outside Kabul city limits. 
This is an important step towards the further development of ANA because most of 
these weapons will likely to be used to equip ANA units. 86 
Besides the security issues, ISAF has been helping the Afghan authorities and 
international assistance organizations in the reconstruction of the country under the 
terms of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). ISAF coordinates CIMIC projects 
throughout its AOR. These projects have been focused on supporting the provision of 
basic human needs such as fresh water, electrical power, shelter, and on the 
improvement of the local infrastructure destroyed by 23 years of conflict. CIMIC 
projects have also supported the rebuilding of medical facilities and the renovation of 
                                                 
83 NATO Press Statement, August 11, 2003, “NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission”, available at 
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84 Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a 
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schools.87 Support to humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development is 
critical to mission success. However, due to the limited resources, ISAF needed to 
select carefully the projects that have broad and rapid impact. 
 
2.5.2 Area of Responsibility 
The Military Technical Agreement has detailed ISAF’s area responsibility, 
which included an area from Bagram to Kabul and its environs. The AOR is marked 
out on the map in the Annex B of the Military Technical Agreement.88 
Since the deployment of ISAF, Kabul has become a more secure place. Crime 
rate was reduced and the city has come back to life. This has mainly happened 
because ISAF has given the people of Kabul, a sense of stability and security. 
However, other parts of the country have remained unstable and insecure. The 
Afghan government, UNAMA, and most of the NGOs in the country have advocated 
ISAF's geographic mandate to be expanded beyond Kabul since early 2002.89 In 
addition, most Afghans, including powerful regional leaders such as General Rashid 
Dostum and Abdul Karim Khalili, have supported the idea of expansion. The UN 
Secretary General, Koffi Annan requested in his report that the Security Council take 
into consideration the wish of the Afghan people for the expansion of ISAF.90  
The Bonn Agreement had left open the possibility that ISAF could be 
expanded across Afghanistan in the future. However, the U.S. and most of the troop 
                                                 
87 NATO Press Statement, August 11, 2003, “NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission”, available at 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm>. 
88 See Appendix E for that map. 
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90 UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for 
International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)”, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 57-59. 
31 
 
contributing nations opposed expansion.91 In addition, another Security Council 
resolution would be necessary to authorize ISAF to expand its mission beyond 
Kabul. 
Only after NATO assumed the ISAF command it became possible to expand 
the ISAF’s area responsibility beyond Kabul. On October 6, 2003, the NATO 
Secretary General informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that North 
Atlantic Council had approved a set of preliminary decisions related to a possible 
expansion of NATO’s ISAF mission. Following this, the Security Council approved 
Resolution 1510 in October 2003 after it received a letter from the government of 
Afghanistan in which the Afghan government requested the Council to consider 
expanding the mandate of ISAF.92 
In the text of Resolution 1510, the Security Council authorized 
expansion of the mandate of the ISAF to allow it, as resources permit, to 
support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the 
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its 
environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the UN and 
other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction 
and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide 
security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn 
Agreement.93  
 
2.6 Organization of ISAF 
2.6.1 Force Composition 
ISAF is not a fixed organization because it is a multinational force with 
several countries providing personnel. However, its composition has remained 
                                                 
91 HRW (Human Rights Watch) Report, December 5, 2002, “Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One 
Year Later A Catalog of Missed Opportunities”, available at <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ 
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Factsheet Series, available at <www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ViewsonAfghanistan.pdf>; see also 
Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, “Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in 
Afghanistan,” The Washington Quarterly 26(1): 35-52. 
92 UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (S/RES/1510), October 13, 2003. 
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relatively constant. From the beginning, it was anticipated that ISAF would sustain a 
force of around 5,000 military personnel.94  
The countries and individual contributions by each country have changed on 
a regular basis due to the rotation of troops. As the lead nations for ISAF and KMNB 
changed, the previous lead nations decreased and the new lead nations increased their 
contributions and the number of their troops. Besides, while some countries drew 
back their troops from ISAF, others inserted their troops to ISAF. Therefore, the 
number of ISAF troops remained around 5,000. The examples of troop contributions 
at different dates were shown in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5.  
 
Table 2: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 7 March 200295 
1 Austria 56 10 New Zealand 7
2 Bulgaria 32 11 Norway 27
3 Denmark 47 12 Portugal 8
4 Finland 46 13 Romania 26
5 France 499 14 Spain 340
6 Germany 879 15 Sweden 40
7 Greece 121 16 Turkey 275
8 Italy 357 17 United Kingdom 1863
9 Netherlands 218
 
Total 4841
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Anthony Mckeown, 2003, “Repeating History? Warlords, Promises, and Indifference in the ‘New’ 
Afghanistan”, Bristol University, available at <http://naspir.org/members/anthony_mckeown/ 
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Table 3: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 31 July 200296 
1 Austria 71 11 Italy 403
2 Belgium 19 12 Netherlands 232
3 Bulgaria 32 13 New Zealand 8
4 Czech Republic 132 14 Norway 17
5 Denmark 36 15 Romania 55
6 Finland 31 16 Spain 349
7 France 520 17 Sweden 38
8 Germany 1121 18 Turkey 1322
9 Greece 163 19 United Kingdom 426
10 Ireland 7
 
Total 4982
 
Table 4: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 11 August 2003 97 
1 Albania 23 17 Italy 135
2 Azerbaijan 23 18 Latvia 9
3 Belgium 241 19 Lithuania 2
4 Bulgaria 42 20 Macedonia 10
5 Canada 1900 21 Netherlands 43
6 Croatia 36 22 New Zealand 4
7 Czech Republic 7 23 Norway 64
8 Denmark 49 24 Poland 12
9 Estonia 6 25 Romania 32
10 Finland 31 26 Spain 113
11 France 548 27 Sweden 21
12 Germany 1500 28 Switzerland 2
13 Greece 125 29 Turkey 163
14 Hungary 11 30 United Kingdom 267
15 Iceland 1 31 United States 110
16 Ireland 7
 
Total 5537
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Table 5: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 29 March 2004 98 
1 Afghanistan 80 19 Latvia 11
2 Albania 22 20 Lithuania 2
3 Azerbaijan 22 21 Macedonia 11
4 Belgium 280 22 Netherlands 24
5 Bulgaria 38 23 New Zealand 3
6 Canada 1756 24 Norway 241
7 Croatia 47 25 Poland 18
8 Czech Republic 17 26 Portugal 1
9 Denmark 96 27 Romania 27
10 Estonia 6 28 Slovenia 21
11 Finland 42 29 Spain 118
12 France 536 30 Sweden 46
13 Germany 1833 31 Switzerland 4
14 Greece 167 32 Turkey 151
15 Hungary 13 33 United Kingdom 354
16 Iceland 1 34 United States 60
17 Ireland 7
18 Italy 481
 
Total 6536
 
As seen on these tables, the lead nations and some other countries contributed the 
highest number of troops while some countries provided symbolic contributions. 
Fundamentally, ISAF was structured into three main components: ISAF 
headquarters, the KMNB, and the Kabul International Airport Task Force. Figure 2 
shows the components of ISAF. The ISAF headquarters serves as the operational 
command for the mission. It liaises with and assists in the work of UN, the Afghan 
Authorities, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The KMNB is 
ISAF’s tactical headquarters. It is responsible for tactical command of the troops on 
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the ground and the planning and conduct of patrolling.99 The Kabul International 
Airport Task Force is responsible for running the military part of the airport, which 
was a crucial link in ISAF’s logistics operations and Afghanistan’s window to 
outside world. 
Figure 2: The Components of ISAF 
 
ISAF is a light force. It has no heavy weapons such as tanks, attack 
helicopters, or artillery, and mobility has been provided mainly by wheeled vehicles. 
All the vehicles and equipment should be transportable by aircraft, because the 
deployment to Afghanistan must be only by air. 
  
2.6.2 Command and Control Structure 
Figure 3 illustrates the basic command and control structure of ISAF, which 
is essentially the structure that has been in place from the ISAF’s inception. After 
NATO assumed the leadership of ISAF, the command and control structure slightly 
changed as it was described above (A Brief History of ISAF). In addition, military 
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elements of the German-led PRT in Kunduz became subject to the ISAF chain of 
command on January 6, 2004. 
Figure 3: Basic Command and Control Structure of ISAF100 
 
There is no direct link between UN and ISAF. The UN communicates its 
input to ISAF through UNAMA and other UN agencies, but the TCNs are free to 
commit or withdraw their personnel at their own judgment, without official 
objections from the UN.101  However, the lead nations of ISAF provide periodic 
reports on the activities of ISAF and the progress towards the implementation of its 
mandate to the UN. 
According to the MOU signed between TCNs, command of ISAF and the 
post of COMISAF were to be held by the lead nation. Members of TCNs were to 
remain under full command of their national contingent commander. Operational 
control of all national contingents contributed to ISAF was assigned to COMISAF. 
COMISAF had coordinating authority over national logistics assets in order to meet 
operational requirements or to prevent confliction of use of limited infrastructure or 
                                                 
100 Turkish General Staff, “Command Structure of ISAF”, available at <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/ 
genelkumay/bashalk/isaf_int/kurulus.htm>. 
101 Anthony Mckeown, 2003, “Repeating History? Warlords, Promises, and Indifference in the ‘New’ 
Afghanistan”, Bristol University, available at <http://naspir.org/members/anthony_mckeown/ 
repeating_history.pdf>. 
Lead Nation UN Troop Contributing 
Nations
ISAF 
KMNB KIA Task Force 
Coordination Coordination 
37 
 
assets. National contingent commanders were responsible for the supply and 
maintenance of order and discipline within national contingent under his/her 
command.102 
 
2.7 Competences 
The ISAF mission was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
providing for robust Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Security Council resolutions 
on ISAF authorize the member states participating in ISAF to “take all necessary 
measures to fulfill its mandate.” This means, under the UN authority, ISAF has the 
right to use all necessary measures, in other words lethal force if necessary to carry 
out its mandate.103 
The ROE for ISAF were drafted using NATO language as in NATO 
operations in the Balkans. This gives COMISAF a suitable degree of control over the 
use of force. The fundamental driver for the level of permissiveness in the ROE 
profile is force protection rather than the ISAF mission. Members of ISAF may 
possess and carry arms and ammunition for the purposes of carrying out the ISAF 
mission.104 
According to MTA signed between ISAF and IA: 
• The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF 
Commander will have the authority, without interference or permission, to 
do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use 
of force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission. 
• The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF will 
have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the 
territory and airspace of Afghanistan. 
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• In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is 
authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and the 
regulation of surface military traffic throughout the area of responsibility. 
• The ISAF will have the right to utilize such means and services as 
required to ensure full ability to communicate and will have the right to 
the unrestricted use of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for 
this purpose. 
• The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to civilian 
or government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF 
Mission. Claims for other damage or injury will be submitted through 
Interim Administration to the ISAF. 
• The Interim Administration agrees that it will return all military units 
based in Kabul into designated barracks as soon as possible. Such units 
will not leave those barracks without the prior approval of the Interim 
Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman 
of the Interim Administration. 
• The Interim Administration will refrain from all offensive actions within 
the AOR. 
• The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison 
personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention.105  
As mentioned before, the role of ISAF is to assist the IA and its successors, 
not to replace its role. There are a number of limitations to this supporting role. If 
ISAF considers that security activities within Kabul are inappropriate or undesirable, 
its ability to intervene is limited if these activities under the control of the IA/TA. In 
such circumstances, ISAF does not have the authority to use force. Such difficulties 
have to be overcome through dialogue. Moreover, linking ISAF to the IA/TA in this 
way might inhibit its ability to deal with other powerful groups within the city that are 
not part of the IA/TA. 
 
2.8 Finance of ISAF 
According to UN Security Council Resolution 1386, the TCNs were expected 
to bear the burden of their participation. However, with the establishment of ISAF, 
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the UN Security Council authorized the creation of a trust fund to support ISAF and 
the countries participating in the operation.106 
The MOU signed between the TCNs detailed the finance of ISAF. According 
to the MOU, each participant is responsible for the funding of its own contribution 
to, participation in and withdrawal from ISAF. Participants will be individually 
responsible for payment of:  
• All pay and allowances for their forces, including the civilian component; 
• All costs, including accommodation, travel and other expenses, arising out 
of business performed by their forces, including the civilian component, 
away from HQ ISAF; 
• All costs arising from the deployment of their forces, including the civilian 
component, to and from theatre.107 
In addition, a Financial Management Group (FMG) has been established for 
the management of multinational financial issues. It is comprised national contingent 
commanders or their nominees. Multinational costs have been shared between the 
TCNs in the proportions detailed in the MOU.  The FMG have authority and 
responsibility for determining whether a specific expenditure is a multinational-
shared cost and determining the cost-sharing formula to be applied. It also has the 
responsibility for resolving the financial disputes between the TCNs.108 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
TURKEY’S LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
 
ASSISTANCE FORCE 
 
(ISAF II) 
 
 
 
3.1 Turkey and Peace Operations 
Since its foundation, Turkey’s policy has always been to integrate with the 
community of modern nations. Turkey’s doctrine for foreign relations, which has 
held true to this day, was formulated in the words of Atatürk, “Peace at Home, Peace 
in the World.” Turkey has usually supported peace initiatives by the UN, NATO and 
other regional organizations in order to preserve international peace and security. Her 
commitment to peace operations is reaffirmed in the Ministry of National Defense 
White Book 2000, which states “Turkey provides support to the Peace Operations 
carried out under the sanctions or control of the UN, NATO or the OSCE for world 
and regional peace, in the direction of the principle of Peace at Home, Peace in the 
World.”109 
The first example of Turkish contribution to peace operations is during the 
Korean War. Turkey deployed a brigade consisting of 4,500 soldiers under the 
command of the UN.110 After the Korean War, she became a member of NATO. 
During the Cold War, she was preoccupied with her own immediate security 
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concerns. She did not participate actively in the UN peace operations. She wanted 
neither to be a battlefield for the Cold War, nor to provoke Russia. In addition, her 
troubled relations with Greece and domestic conflicts limited Turkey’s ability to 
deploy her troops outside the country. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union concluded the Cold War era. During the 
Cold War, the threat to international peace and security was specific, massive, and 
static. Following the end of the Cold War, this kind of threat was replaced by multi-
dimensional threats such as terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction, 
regional uncertainties and instabilities, ethnic cleansing, religious fundamentalism. 
Since Turkey is surrounded by the Caucasus, Middle East, and the Balkans she is at 
the center of volatility and instability. This has made it necessary for Turkey to react 
properly to new security challenges, respond to crises, and be prepared for 
unexpected developments.111 
After the Cold War, Turkey began to pay particular attention to peace 
operations. Turkish policy on peace operations has become a part of its foreign and 
security policy, and her contribution to the UN peace efforts has increased. Turkey 
participated in UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) with a mechanized company 
of 300 personnel from January 1993 to February 1994. For a time, a Turkish general 
(General Çevik Bir) assumed the command of the peacekeeping force, called 
UNOSOM II.112  
Turkey also contributed to the Italian-led multinational force in Albania, 
called Operation Alba, with a Marine Battalion Task Force comprised of 779 
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personnel from April to August 1997. A Turkish general served as deputy 
commander of Operation Alba.113 
Turkey provided a regimental size unit for UNPROFOR. After IFOR was 
established under the auspices of NATO, Turkey reinforced the Turkish regiment in 
UNPROFOR to the brigade size and assigned it to IFOR. Later, the brigade was 
assigned to SFOR, which took over the IFOR’s mission in December 1995. SFOR 
was reorganized in April 2000 and the Turkish contingent was reduced a battalion 
size unit accordingly. In addition to land forces, various Turkish naval vessels and 
aircraft participated in SFOR operations and successfully played an important role. 
The Navy participated in “Operation Sharp Guard” in the Adriatic from July 1992 to 
October 1996.114 Turkish Air Force participated in NATO’s “Operation Deny Flight” 
with an F-16 squadron from April 1993 to December 1995 to enforce the no-flight 
zone over Bosnia and to protect “safe areas.”115 
During the Kosovo crisis in February 1999, ten F-16 aircraft were assigned to 
NATO’s “Operation Allied Force.” Moreover, Turkey has assigned a mechanized 
infantry battalion comprising 998 personnel to KFOR since July 1999. Additionally, 
Turkey has contributed frigates, destroyers, tanker and minesweeper vessels to the 
Kosovo operation.116 
Besides the peace operations mentioned above, Turkey also participated in 
several international observer missions named UN Iraq-Iran Observer Group 
(UNIIMOG), UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UN Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
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(TIPH). Turkey has also backed the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET).117 
In order to contribute to regional security and stability, while participating in 
several peace operations, Turkey assumed a leading role in the formation of the 
Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force (SEEBRIG) and the Black Sea 
Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR).118 Turkey also continues to 
contribute to international peace and stability efforts within the framework of PfP 
programs. For example, Turkey established a PfP Training Center in June 1998 in 
Ankara. This is the first recognized PfP Training Center in NATO.119 
Turkey believes every dispute has a specific reason, so the mandates of the 
peacekeeping forces should be clear and feasible. Also, the parties’ consent to the 
conflict, transparency, limited mission duration, impartiality, and credibility are the 
prerequisites for success in peace operations. The effectiveness of peace operations 
can be greatly increased through a more transparent functioning of the UN Security 
Council and an efficient consultation mechanism with troop contributing nations.120 
After the September 11 attacks, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors 
in the fight against terrorism and supported the international coalition that mobilized 
soon after the attacks. After the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was removed from 
power, it was possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country. 
Although not able to make a significant contribution in terms of financial aid and 
                                                 
117 Turkish General Staff. 2001. Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace. Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Basımevi, pp. 17-25. 
118 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, “Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey’s Security”, in Ali L. 
Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects 
and Pitfalls, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, pp. 11-23. 
119 Turkish General Staff, April 2001, Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, 
Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, pp. 15-16. 
120 Turkish MFA Website, “Turkey’s Contribution and Approach to UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 
available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/groupa/ peacekeeping.htm>. 
44 
 
economic reconstruction, Turkey actively participated in ISAF. Significantly, after 
Great Britain’s leadership, Turkey took over the command of ISAF.121 
 
3.2 The Road to Turkey’s Leadership of ISAF 
3.2.1 The September 11 and Turkey 
During the Cold War, Turkey was a strong ally of the West against the 
Warsaw Pact. After September 11, she became an important ally against international 
terrorism. The U.S. efforts to eradicate terrorists in Afghanistan and in the Middle 
East brought Turkey to the forefront. She has borders with Middle Eastern countries 
and is the nearest country to Afghanistan within NATO. Additionally, as a Muslim 
country, Turkey is a part of the Islamic world and as a secular democracy, a part of 
the Western world. It was considered that Turkey, acting together with the Western 
world, might prevent the war on terrorism from turning into a clash between Western 
and Islamic civilizations.122 
Turkey is very sensitive to terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, she was 
the only state who understood the U.S. feelings most. She has long suffered from 
terrorism and lost thousands of her citizens in terrorist attacks. In the country’s 
defense policy, Turkey defines terrorism as the major threat against the world peace. 
Whatever its source is, terrorism has a global character and international 
consequences.123 However, Turkey could not received necessary international 
support in its own fight against terrorism. On the contrary, her struggle has always 
been a point of tension in her relations with Western countries. However, after 
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September 11, Turkey was one of the beneficiaries of the new international 
atmosphere. At last, terrorism was recognized as an international concern.124 Turkey 
grasped this opportunity without delay and joined international cooperation against 
terrorism. Following the September 11 attacks, Turkish officials immediately 
condemned the attacks as a crime against humanity and supported NATO’s decision 
to invoke Article V of the Washington Treaty. 
Turkey also argued that the September 11 attacks showed that Turkey’s own 
counter-terrorist policies are warranted. After Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
pointed out that terrorism was a crime committed against all humanity, he went on to 
say that “the attacks on the U.S. has shown how correct Turkey is in her stance 
against terrorism.” Similarly, Ismail Cem pointed out that “what everyone is trying to 
do collectively today is no different to that which Turkey has strived to achieve for 
years.”125 So, Turkey emerged as an important U.S. partner in the fight against 
terrorism. In October 2001, the Turkish government obtained a parliamentary 
authorization to contribute troops to the U.S. campaign. The bill also authorized the 
government to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and permit 
the use of Turkish airspace and airbases. During the campaign against Afghanistan, 
Turkey gave the U.S. overflight rights, helped with airplane refueling from Incirlik 
Air Base, and provided intelligence.126 
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3.2.2 Turkish-Afghan Relations 
Turkey’s interest in Afghanistan is not new. She has deep-rooted ties of 
friendship with that country. These friendly relations go back to even before 1923. 
Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha played a significant role in enhancing relations 
between the two countries. Cemal Pasha worked hard to make European countries 
recognize Afghanistan, and he succeeded.127 Afghanistan was the first country to 
recognize the new Turkish republic. During the early years of the Republic, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk sent to Afghanistan military officials, experts, and trainers to 
contribute to the modernization of Afghanistan. Afghan King Emanullah Khan 
visited Turkey in 1928 and returned to Afghanistan having been inspired from 
Atatürk’s reforms. Later on, during the 1930s, Turkey dispatched teachers and 
professors to Afghanistan in the fields of medicine, law and political sciences.128 
Many Afghan students and officers were educated in Turkey. Before World War II, 
Germany and Italy began to get active in Afghanistan in the context of their invasion 
and occupation activities and they tried to penetrate this country. Turkey again came 
to Afghanistan’s aid in its difficult position. In 1937, with Turkey’s initiative, the 
“Sadabat Pact” was signed between Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. Later, Iraq joined 
this Pact. In the troubling days before World War II, these countries, acting together, 
supported each other. So, German and Italian dominance of Afghanistan was 
prevented.129 
Turkey’s friendly relations with Afghanistan weakened by the 1990s due to 
the Second World War and increased Soviet influence that finally led to the Soviet 
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occupation. From the 1990s onward, Turkey began implementing assistance projects, 
particularly in the humanitarian field, providing medical and educational services and 
shelter to the people of Afghanistan.130 Even before September 11, Turkey backed 
the NA in its fight against the Taliban regime whose Islamic fundamentalism was 
disliked by Ankara. 
 
3.2.3 Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF I 
Turkey has long advocated a broad-based Afghan government including all 
ethnic groups for lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan. After the September 11 
attacks and the following events in Afghanistan, when the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1386, establishing ISAF, it was only natural for Turkey to take 
part in that Force.131 Turkey participated in ISAF I with an infantry company 
composed of 267 soldiers. The Turkish company was deployed in Kabul on February 
15, 2002.132 It carried out security patrols and participated in humanitarian aid 
efforts. 
On the other hand, Great Britain had assumed the command of ISAF for three 
months and wanted to hand it over. The main reason why Great Britain was so ready 
to do so was that the ISAF’s three-month commanding mission would be over by the 
end of April. The Blair government wanted to transfer its duties to another country 
by that time, particularly given the pressure it was receiving from the opposition.133 
Turkey had long been pointed out as the most likely successor to lead ISAF after 
Great Britain. Initially, Turkey was eager to lead ISAF and expressed her interest in 
this direction. Moreover, Great Britain and the U.S. officials regarded Turkey, a 
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NATO member and Muslim populated country, as the “perfect choice.” 
Nevertheless, Turkey would later hesitate due to some specific concerns which will 
be explained in the following sections. 
 
3.2.4 Turkey: A Perfect Choice to lead ISAF 
The U.S. operation against Afghanistan and support for Usama bin Laden in 
some parts of the Islamic world created fears that these developments might lead to a 
“Christian-Muslim confrontation.” Therefore, the U.S. administration tried to prevent 
this possibility. Within this light, Turkey emerged as a valuable partner for American 
policy.134 The U.S. insistently wanted Turkey to assume the command of ISAF as the 
presence of Muslim troops would eliminate accusations that America’s war against 
international terrorism was in fact directed against Islam. Furthermore, being a 
secular democracy with almost an entirely Muslim population, the Turkish model 
was expressed as an alternative to the Taliban version of Islam for Afghanistan, not 
only by the Turkish policy makers, but also by the international observers and U.S. 
officials.135 
Additionally, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and has valuable 
experience in peace operations. Turkey's army is one of the very few armies in the 
world that has the capability of coping with such kind of missions and Turkey has 
important historical and cultural ties to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This was an 
important asset for Turkey’s leadership being welcomed by the population of 
Afghanistan. 
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3.2.5 Turkey’s Motivations 
Although Turkey has historical bonds with Afghanistan and Central Asia, she 
usually adopted a circumspect attitude toward the region. ISAF provided a new 
opportunity to enhance her role in the region and she, in principle, did not want to 
miss this opportunity.136 It was the first time that Turkish military would assume the 
full command of a multinational force.137 It would be a great test for the Turkish 
General Staff, which until that time had never been vested with such broad 
responsibilities in a peace operation. The Turkish army is regarded as a considerable 
regional force, but leadership of ISAF would further its claim to a greater role 
outside its immediate environment. Moreover, since Turkey wants to consolidate its 
role as a regional power, this would be an important opportunity to promote this 
objective. The success would boost its profile both in the region and in the eyes of 
the international community.138 
Turkey suffered from terrorism for years and wanted to assist the 
international community in the global war against terrorism. Turks believe that 
terrorism is a common challenge which requires a common response. It can strike 
any community at any time. Moreover, the close historical and ethnic ties with 
Afghanistan were another motivation for her to accept the command of ISAF. She 
wished to extend a helping hand to the people of Afghanistan.139 
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On the political and economic side, Ankara believed the leadership of ISAF 
would increase Turkey’s prestige in the international arena and the government 
wanted to receive sympathetic support on various issues. Turkey had already 
received some concessions from the World Bank and the IMF on the economic front. 
Turkish leaders thought that by helping the U.S., these concessions would continue. 
Also, Turkish leaders believed that Turkey’s leadership of ISAF would show 
Turkey’s strong commitment to the centrality of her role in Western and NATO 
strategic thinking and would be beneficial in Turkey’s bid for the EU membership.140 
Furthermore, in the context of growing American-Turkish strategic partnership, 
Turkish officials believed the U.S. would press the EU to accept Turkey to 
membership. 
 
3.2.6 Turkey’s Hesitations 
When the decision to send a multinational force to Afghanistan was being 
made, Turkey was among the first countries to announce her wish to participate and 
later lead the Force. However, the military and political authorities concluded that 
the task was not as easy as it first seemed when they studied the matter in depth. 
Consequently, Turkey lost the initial enthusiasm and started to approach the event in 
a more rational fashion. She started giving signals to the international community 
that she was not very keen to accept the post. Nevertheless, no other country stepped 
forward to take over the command and Turkey came to the forefront again. Realizing 
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there was no escape from the mission, the Turkish government put forward some 
concerns over the size, scope and the cost of the mission.141  
Officials from Turkey, Britain and the U.S. came together several times to 
work out Turkey’s concerns on her possible takeover of the command of ISAF. 
Turkey requested financial support and clarification of the mission’s mandate. She 
sought assurances that NATO members would maintain their presence in 
Afghanistan and that Turkey would receive logistic support. Turkey also wanted the 
ISAF’s area of responsibility to remain confined to Kabul and surrounding areas, and 
opposed any expansion.142 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit made it clear that Turkey 
did not want to be forced to operate beyond Kabul and that providing security 
outside the capital should be left to Afghans.143 
During the negotiations, the economic problems came to the forefront as the 
main reason for the delay.144 Turkey was seeking firm assurances that the 
international community would share the financial burden caused by her taking over 
the command of ISAF because she was recovering from its worst economic crisis 
since World War II. Countries contributing to the Force were meeting the expenses 
of their own troops. Turkey’s expenses would increase as the number of her troops 
participating in the Force grew due to its taking command. In his visit to the US, the 
Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, stated: “The costs of deploying troops 
overseas exceeds Turkey’s planned defense budget.”145 
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Besides economical concerns, Turkey was also cautious about the political 
situation in Afghanistan and a possible U.S. military strike on Iraq.146 Afghanistan is 
a difficult and unpredictable country exposing risks for peacekeepers. The remnants 
of Taliban and Al Qaeda still pose a threat to ISAF personnel. Afghanistan is one of 
the countries that produces narcotics, and has many refugees in neighboring 
countries. While the outside of the Kabul was not secure yet, the Afghan refugees 
wished to return to Kabul. As the refugees returned to Kabul, it would be necessary 
to find food, homes and jobs for them to prevent them from resorting to illegal 
means. Moreover, the aggression in uncontrolled territories, especially in the 
northern part, of Afghanistan might spread and threaten the peacekeepers.147 On the 
other hand, a U.S. operation in Iraq might reduce the U.S. interest in Afghanistan and 
incite ethnic rivalries there. This kind of development would probably jeopardize the 
ISAF mission. 
All these concerns led Turkey to be cautious. Turkey did not want to blindly 
assume command of ISAF. Doubtless, this mission would enhance Turkey’s 
reputation; however, the risks needed to be minimized before Turkey took it on.148 
According to Maloney, this delay was a tactic used by Turkey to get more 
concessions from the U.S. in areas unrelated to Afghanistan. Turkey tried to get 
concessions from the U.S. on the Cyprus issue and economic field.149 
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3.3 Transfer of Authority from Great Britain to Turkey 
After a series of negotiations, some promises were given to Turkey 
considering her concerns, and then, on April 29, 2002, the Turkish government 
decided to assume the command of ISAF for a period of six months. In the letter 
dated 9 May 2002 from Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General, Turkey requested a new Security Council 
resolution authorizing lead nation status of Turkey and an extension be granted for 
the ISAF mandate. Resolution 1386 had authorized ISAF for only six months and it 
would expire in June 2002.150  
Through this letter, the Turkish government also delivered its provision 
including the mandate and the ISAF’s AOR would be maintained as stipulated by the 
Security Council in its Resolution 1386.151 On May 23, 2002, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1413. After reaffirming the articles of Resolution 1386, 
Resolution 1413 extended the mandate of ISAF for a period of six months beyond 
June 20 and authorized the lead nation status of Turkey.152 
After Turkey decided to assume command of ISAF, a Turkish reconnaissance 
team went to Kabul to determine the requirements of the operation. Following this, 
the necessary preparations were made in Ankara and the first units of Turkish 
military contingents assigned to ISAF began to be transported to Afghanistan on 
May 24, 2002. The transportation of all the personnel and equipment continued until 
the end of June. For the transportation of the personnel, Turkish Airlines aircraft 
were chartered in addition to Turkish Air Force’s C-130 and C-160 aircraft; Russian 
AN-124 airplanes were chartered for the transportation of equipment. 
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Turkey officially took over command of ISAF from Great Britain in a 
colorful military ceremony in Kabul on June 20, 2002. The newly elected Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai, Defense Minister Fahim Khan, and the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi attended the handover 
ceremony. The transition of command was completed smoothly and without any 
gaps in operations. The Turkish Battle Group moved into the south of Kabul to take 
over the mission of the United Kingdom Battle Group as of 27 June 2002. Turkey 
also took operational command of the Kabul airbase on June 30, 2002.153 
 
3.4 The Organization of ISAF II 
3.4.1 ISAF II Task Organization 
The ISAF II organizational structure consisted of the ISAF Headquarters 
(with its own Communication and Information unit, Service unit, Protection unit, a 
CIMIC Coordination Center, Force Liaison elements, Human Intelligence teams, and 
Information Operations/ Psychological Operations units), the KMNB, and the Kabul 
Airport Task Force. Germany was the lead nation for the KMNB. Under the KMNB 
were three battle groups, headed by German, French, and Turkish troops. ISAF Task 
Organization under the Turkish command is shown on the Figure 4. 
 
3.4.2 Command and Control Structure 
ISAF II Headquarters served under the command of the Turkish General 
Staff. Command of ISAF and the post of COMISAF were held by the Republic of 
Turkey. Members of TCNs remained under the full command of National Contingent 
Commanders. Turkish national force elements were under the command of Turkish 
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Military Representative (Deputy COMISAF). Operational control of all National 
Contingents contributed to ISAF was assigned to COMISAF.  
  ISAF activities were executed in coordination with U.S. CENTCOM based 
in Tampa/Florida. Additionally, the Afghanistan Operation Coordination Center 
(AOCC) and Multinational Movement Coordination Center (MNMCC), including a 
section for the liaison officers of TCNs, were established at the Headquarters of 
Turkish General Staff in Ankara to ensure coordination between TCNs. The chain of 
command of ISAF under Turkish command is shown on the Figure 5. 
Figure 4: ISAF II Task Organization154 
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Figure 5: ISAF II Chain of Command155 
 
 
3.4.3 Force Composition 
ISAF II had an authorized personnel strength of roughly 5,000, drawn from 
22 countries. ISAF’s manpower strength included 4517 personnel from 11 NATO 
countries, comprising 95 percent of the total. Twelve EU countries contributed 3,152 
personnel to the Force. This makes up two-thirds of ISAF’s manpower. If Turkey’s 
contributions are added as a candidate country, then the EU component goes up to 94 
percent.156 
At the beginning of Turkey’s tenure, 19 countries were contributing to the 
Force.157 As time passed, Belgium left, and Albania, Azerbaijan, FYROM and 
Lithuania joined the Force. The TCNs and their personnel strength are shown in 
Table 6 and ISAF II Force Composition is shown in Table 7: 
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Table 6: ISAF II Troops Contributing Nations158 
1 Albania 30 13 Italy 442
2 Austria 72 14 Lithuania 4
3 Azerbaijan 30 15 Netherlands 222
4 Bulgaria 27 16 New Zealand 3
5 Czech Republic 133 17 Norway 17
6 Denmark 37 18 Romania 35
7 Finland 43 19 Spain 268
8 France 454 20 Sweden 31
9 FYROM 2 21 Turkey 1331
10 Germany 1139 22 United Kingdom 379
11 Greece 123
12 Ireland 7
 
Total 4829
 
Table 7: ISAF II Force Composition159 
Force Headquarters  Multinational, Turkish led 
Brigade Headquarters  Multinational, centered around a German Brigade headquarters 
Three infantry battle groups 
Turkish battalion 
French battalion 
German-led battalion, including Dutch, Austrian 
and Danish troops 
Other infantry units France, Italy, Turkey, Albania 
Kabul Airport Task Force Turkey, Spain 
Reconnaissance squadron  France 
Engineer group  UK, Greece, Italy, Spain 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Turkey, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Spain  
Medical UK, Germany, Portugal, Czech Republic 
Logistics Turkey, UK, Bulgaria, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain 
Helicopter support Germany, Spain 
Military Police  UK, Germany, Romania 
Other specialist troops Turkey, Finland, Italy, Sweden 
Information Ops/ Psychological 
Ops Turkey 
Air transport support UK, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Portugal 
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3.4.4 Area of Responsibility 
The Area of Responsibility of ISAF under the Turkish command remained 
unchanged. It expanded 50 km in the north-south and 45 km in the east-west 
directions. The total area of the AOR of ISAF II is 2,250 square kilometers.160 The 
ISAF II area responsibility is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: ISAF II Area of Responsibility161 
 
 
3.4.5 Deployment of ISAF II 
ISAF II forces were deployed as follows: ISAF II Headquarters and its 
support units in the center of city, Kabul Airport Task Force in Kabul airport, Kabul 
Multinational Brigade, Turkish Battalion Task Force and 1st Turkish Company in 
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northeast of the city, on the Celalabat road, 2nd and 3rd Turkish Companies in west 
and south of the city and the other units along the road to Kabul airport and along the 
Celalabat road. 162 
The Turkish Task Force operated in the west and southwest; the German 
Task Force, including a Dutch Company and an Austrian Platoon, in the north, center 
and northwest; and the French Task Force in north of the city. The Italian Force 
Protection Company operated in the center.163 
 
3.5 Activities of ISAF II 
3.5.1 Security Issues 
The main threat to the security and stability of Kabul was posed by remnants 
of Taliban and Al Qaeda, as well as various groups opposed to the existence of the 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. These elements were unlikely to have 
massive support, as Afghans had been tired of violence during 23 years of conflict. 
However, Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants might be able to carry out isolated attacks 
in Kabul. Security in Kabul improved everyday during Turkey’s leadership, despite 
the residual threat of terrorism. Terrorist attacks were rare and isolated, and crime 
rates were lower than many Western cities of similar size.164 This situation led to 
lifting the night curfew as of 3 November 2002 for the first time in 23 years, and 
greatly boosted local population’s morale. No major incidents occurred from the date 
that the night curfew was lifted to the end of the Turkey’s leadership.165  
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The assassination of Public Works Minister Hadji Qadir in an attack outside 
his office on July 6, 2002 highlighted the lack of coordination among security 
entities in Kabul and the insufficient security precautions concerning the ministers’ 
personnel safety. ISAF provided assistance with investigating the incident. ISAF 
started to run a close protection training course for the bodyguards of Afghan 
ministers and senior officials and prepared a booklet on individual protection 
measures, which was to be distributed to all senior officials in order to ensure all 
ministers would have adequate protection. Turkish experts visited ministerial 
buildings in order to assess their security arrangements and wrote reports containing 
ISAF’s recommendations. These arrangements were presented to the Afghan 
authorities.166 
ISAF II also tried to initiate a comprehensive security coordination and 
intelligence-sharing system, both among the Afghan security entities themselves, 
such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate for 
Security and Kabul Garrison, and between these entities and ISAF. A Committee for 
Intelligence Coordination was set up. The Committee met on a weekly basis and 
intended to promote effective and timely exchange of intelligence.167 
 During the Turkish leadership, ISAF conducted approximately 50 patrols a 
day on a 24-hour basis, and mostly on foot. Nearly 70 percent of these patrols were 
conducted jointly with the Afghan Police. Random checkpoints were also established 
in close cooperation with the Afghan Police.168 By conducting the activities jointly 
                                                 
166 UN Security Council, August 16,  2002, “Monthly report on the Operations of the International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/940)”. 
167 Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”, Briefing paper 
presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21. 
168 UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, “Quarterly report on International Security Assistance 
Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003(S/2003/210)”. 
61 
 
with the Afghan Police, ISAF helped to train Afghan police officers in conducting 
patrols and treating citizens of Kabul properly.169 
Approximately 1.8 million refugees returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan 
and Iran since the deployment of ISAF. Nearly 600,000 returnees settled in Kabul, 
and most of them were living in tents or houses that were largely destroyed, without 
basic facilities. ISAF provided the United Nation Winterization Task Force with the 
information it collected on concentrations of returnees, it also arranged patrol routes 
in the neighborhood of aid warehouses and stood ready to provide further security 
assistance on a case-by-case basis.170 
ISAF also provided additional security, including checks for explosive 
ordnance, prior to and during national and international conferences, fairs, meetings, 
and visits by foreign statesmen.171 ISAF found and confiscated a significant number 
of weapons and ammunition, including rockets, unexploded ordnance, and air 
defense systems in its AOR. As of 10 February, ISAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) teams destroyed approximately 175,000 rounds of ammunition for heavy 
weapons, including anti-tank weapons, unguided missiles, rockets, mines and anti-
aircraft weapons.172 
 
3.5.2 Information and Psychological Operations 
ISAF ran a strong public information and psychological campaign through all 
available means during Turkey’s leadership. This campaign focused on; 
• Recognition and acceptance of ISAF by the people, 
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• Importance of providing support to ISAF and Afghan Transitional 
Administration, 
• Terrorism as a threat to humanity, 
• Importance of the unity and solidarity among ethnic groups, the 
risks of ethnic segregation in Afghanistan, 
• The superiority of democracy and tolerance, 
• The dangers of unexploded explosive ordnance.173  
Despite the fact that only seven percent of the Kabul citizens had television 
sets and only 40 percent had radios, they were fully aware of ISAF’s role and 
contribution.174 ISAF made use of public announcements by loudspeakers, radio and 
television advertisements, and posters. Moreover, ISAF published a fortnightly 
newssheet called “ISAF News’’ and distributed 50,000 free copies of it in the city 
biweekly. In addition, more than 150,000 leaflets were printed and distributed. ISAF 
also ran two radio stations to inform local population and ISAF troops about ISAF 
activities and security situation in Kabul, “Radyo Türkiyem” and “Sadahje Azadi 
(Voice of Freedom).”175 Radio Türkiyem broadcasted music and international and 
local news, ISAF activities, security situation in Kabul in local languages and 
Turkish. The Voice of Freedom broadcasted music, news and information in local 
languages.176  
 
3.5.3 Communication and Information Systems 
As the lead nation, Turkey provided communication and information systems 
for ISAF II. The main responsibility was to establish a strategic rear link connection 
to AOCC, which was located in Ankara, and to provide communication and 
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information links between the ISAF headquarters and the subordinate commands. 
Secure voice, data and video teleconferencing facilities were established and 
functioned well during Turkey’s leadership. ISAF II had a strategic rear link 
connection to Turkey via Turksat 1-C Satellite.  
Turkey also established a secure VHF/FM radio network in Kabul. Two 
information systems, US Centrix and Turkish secure local area network systems 
were in operation. The US Centrix system was a local area network which was also 
connected to U.S. military installations around the world. It supported office 
applications and provided e-mail and internet services. Turkish secure local area 
network provided the data and message exchange between ISAF headquarters and 
AOCC. Turkey also established an internet service. 
For the use of ISAF personnel, the Turkish Telecom Company provided 
international payphones and a GSM network called “Aycell” at very reasonable 
rates. Calls to Turkey were charged at local Turkish rates, and calls to other countries 
were charged at rates between Turkey and those countries. 
 
3.5.4 Logistics Support 
All logistics and support arrangements functioned smoothly during Turkish 
leadership. TCNs coordinated their efforts through ISAF’s Multinational Joint 
Logistic Component, which met on a weekly basis.177 As the lead nation, Turkey 
concluded a contract with “Supreme Food Service Company”, which had an office in 
Kabul, for the provision of food and fresh water to all ISAF II forces except German, 
French and Spanish. During Turkey’s leadership, ISAF II had ample second-line 
stocks of food and water. Turkey also concluded a contract with “Shell Pakistan Fuel 
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Company” for supply of fuel and LPG to all ISAF forces except Finnish and 
Swedish. Again, ISAF II had sufficient reserves of fuel.178 The countries that did not 
participate in these systems provided themselves the food, water and fuel needs of 
their forces. Turkey also ran the military part of the Kabul Airport, which was a 
crucial link in ISAF’s logistics operations and Afghanistan’s window to outside 
world. Turkey also provided air traffic control for the entire airport.179 
 
3.5.5 CIMIC Issues 
CIMIC activities can be defined as the cooperation and coordination between 
the commander and civilian community, including international and national NGOs 
as well as civil society organizations and local population in order to support the 
mission. Therefore, CIMIC operations became an essential part of the ISAF activities 
and a great importance was attached to conduct them. The coordination and 
cooperation carried out by CIMIC in support of the mission, between ISAF, the 
Afghan authorities, NGOs, and Afghan people greatly contributed to the overall 
success of ISAF.180 It set a bridge between ISAF and other organizations in Kabul.181 
At the very start of the ISAF deployment, education and healthcare took 
priority in CIMIC activities. Since Turkey had taken over ISAF command, 176 
projects were carried out. Local labor was used wherever possible. These projects 
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played an important role in the ongoing reconstruction and rehabilitation process of 
the country.182  
As for the finance of CIMIC projects, there was no specific common fund. 
Turkey provided fund for CIMIC projects being the lead nation as required. There 
was also some fund from EU spent after EU approval. The remaining CIMIC funds 
were provided by ISAF nations subjected to the national approvals.183 A summary of 
CIMIC projects realized during Turkey’s leadership were listed below:184 
• Working and living conditions of ISAF staff and headquarters elements 
were developed. The ISAF accommodations; the mess hall, the kitchen 
and the laundry were built.  
• Local workers were employed in the construction of these new facilities. 
• Military items were provided to the Afghan security forces.  
• Police stations were reconstructed and equipped. 
• A circumcision campaign was conducted and 247 children were 
circumcised during this campaign.  
• Projects specifically aimed at improving the quality of life for children 
such as establishing playgrounds and providing school materials and toys 
were developed. 
• The Rehabilitation Center was restored. Additionally, ambulance medical 
items and medicine were provided to the clinics and the hospitals. The 
clinics were reconstructed. 
• The Emergency Service of Kabul Military Hospital was repaired and 
equipped. 
• ISAF medical assets helped people and conducted health checks even in 
the villages. 
• Baby food was distributed in Kabul.  
• The water shortage is one of the most important problems in Kabul. ISAF 
worked with Kabul Municipality to provide support for the water. A 
phased water project was initiated and first phase of the project covering 
first four districts was completed by ISAF. We also hired three vehicles 
for the chlorination campaign of the Kabul city. 
• Many schools and kindergartens were constructed. The construction of the 
Yakatoot High School is a good example of the restored schools. Yakatoot 
High School is one of the biggest schools in Kabul and has 6000 boys and 
girls on its roll. 
• School items and toys were distributed to the schools and kindergartens. 
• The oldest and most historical mosque of Kabul was restored. 
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• ISAF provided transformers to districts suffering from electricity 
problems. 
• The veterinarian support was also provided in some districts.  
• ISAF engineers constructed roads and sewerage. 
• ISAF also actively participated in the winterization studies to assist the 
UN organizations and local authorities in dealing with the problems of the 
returnees. 
• The Library and the Reproduction Center of Kabul University were 
repaired. 
• Fire Fighting, Air Traffic Control and Meteorology Training were given to 
the Afghan staff.185 
Furthermore, Turkey handed over to the Afghan Authorities eight buildings, 
which were constructed or renovated for the use of Turkish units in the city.186 
 
3.5.6 Training Issues 
As mentioned before, one of ISAF’s tasks is to assist with the establishment 
of new Afghan security structures including a new ANA. ISAF II supported the 
process of establishing and training of a new ANA, which would serve the interests 
of the entire Afghan nation. Its assistance ranged from advice on conceptual matters 
of organization to the provision of specialized training for individual battalions.187 
Toward the end of Turkey’s leadership, TA issued a final government decree, 
proposing the formation of four new corps, instead of the ten corps controlled by 
regional leaders. The plans for a National Army envisaged the formation of a central 
corps in Kabul and three additional corps to be located in other provinces, with 
70,000 troops.188 Turkish instructors provided ten weeks of advanced training 
between 21 September and 01 December 2002 to the 1st Battalion of the Afghan 
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National Guard, which had been initially trained by ISAF during the UK leadership 
and later equipped and dressed by Turkey.189 During Turkey’s leadership, Turkish 
and Italian instructors provided close protection training to 794 bodyguards, in an 
effort to ensure all ministers have adequate protection. The bodyguards of the former 
king were given weapon training.190 
 
3.6 Relations with Local Population, Afghan Authorities, NGOs and UN 
Agencies 
The Turkish ISAF leadership took great care to remain equally distant to all 
ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It avoided any involvement in Afghan domestic 
politics. The Turkish ISAF leadership and all ISAF personnel fully respected Afghan 
customs, cultural values and religious beliefs. The commander of ISAF issued strict 
orders to all ISAF II personnel to be polite and kind to Afghan citizens at all times. 
ISAF II worked in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the 
representatives of the UN and NGOs.191 These fundamental operating principles of 
Turkish ISAF leadership contributed the success of ISAF greatly.192 
These principles also helped ISAF to win the full confidence of Afghan 
authorities and the Afghan people. The citizens of Kabul knew that ISAF personnel 
were there to help them. One of the crucial aspects of peace operations is to secure 
and maintain mutual trust and respect. ISAF Turkish leadership achieved and 
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maintained this.193 There was no show of hostility towards ISAF personnel during 
the Turkish leadership.194 
The ISAF leadership was able to establish excellent professional relations 
with Afghan authorities. There was full harmony between the objectives of ISAF and 
TA. The Commander of ISAF maintained regular contacts with President Karzai, 
Defense Minister Fahim Khan, Interior Minister Muhammed Wardak and the other 
Afghan officials. 195 ISAF II also worked in close consultation with Lakhdar Brahimi, 
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, by regular bilateral 
contacts, periodic meetings and kept continuity of the presence of a UN 
representative at daily ISAF briefings.196  
Furthermore, ISAF was actively involved in the work of the Joint 
Coordinating Body (JCB) set up in accordance with the MTA. During the Turkish 
ISAF leadership, the JCB became a highly effective and operational body, allowing 
periodic consultations among ISAF, the UN and the Afghan authorities on security 
issues and coordinated activities. 197  
It was essential to establish an effective and continuing coordination between 
ISAF and various NGOs in Kabul. Projects, which would be carried out, had to be 
well evaluated and deconflicted. ISAF established good coordination and 
cooperation with NGOs with the help of its CIMIC teams.  
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3.7 Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF III and ISAF IV 
Turkish leadership ended on February 10, 2003 and German-Dutch 
leadership took over the ISAF command. The redeployment of Turkish units started 
on January 23, 2003 and was completed on February 20, 2003. However, Turkey 
continued to contribute ISAF III and later ISAF IV with a reinforced company team 
supported by logistics and administration units as in ISAF I. An Azerbaijani and an 
Albanian platoon of 23 personnel each have been also included into the structure of 
the Turkish company and Turkey assigned staff officers to ISAF headquarters. 
Recently, in line with NATO's demand and as a requirement of its responsibilities as 
a NATO member country, Turkey directed 3 helicopters and 56 flight and 
maintenance personnel to serve ISAF.  
 
3.8 Lessons learned 
The main principle in peace operations is to show polite behavior to people, 
and take great care to set an equal approach to all ethnic groups making up the 
country in which you operate. Another important point is to avoid any interference 
with the domestic politics of the country. In addition, all the personnel should respect 
the customs, cultural values and religious beliefs. In other words, they should be 
careful about the sensitivities of the country. Otherwise, people can easily see them 
as the invaders of their country. For this reason, it is essential for countries to provide 
prior training to their personnel on this delicate aspect of peace operations, which 
require politeness and impartiality towards to the local population.198 
During her leadership, Turkey gave great importance to these issues. In the 
beginning, Turkey’s relations with General Rashid Dostum had caused some anxiety 
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in Afghanistan. Later, as Turkish leadership acted in an impartial way, she won the 
Afghan people and authorities’ confidence. The mutual trust and respect between the 
Afghan people and ISAF personnel became the most critical aspect of the ISAF II 
operation. General Hilmi Akın Zorlu issued strict orders to all ISAF personnel to be 
polite and kind to Afghan people at all times, and to remain equally distant to all 
ethnic groups in Kabul. Thanks to these principles, a good relationship between the 
Afghan people and ISAF personnel was established and during the Turkey’s 
leadership, any hostile act against the ISAF personnel did not occur. 
Working in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the 
UN representatives and NGOs was another key issue. A perfect reconnaissance with 
the specialists before coming to theatre is of crucial importance. It helps to clarify the 
real requirements of personnel, logistics, communications and all the other 
equipment.  
The ratio among combat troops and support personnel in peace operations 
should be determined carefully. While ISAF II had roughly 4,800 personnel, only 
850 were infantry troops assigned patrolling and checkpoint duties; the rest were 
staff and support personnel. The main reason for this was the preference of most of 
the countries to assign support troops instead of combat troops.199 
Reacting against incidents and reporting correctly and timely in a peace 
operation are essential for command and control units to follow the ongoing situation 
properly. For this purpose, during Turkey’s leadership, seminars were made available 
to train the staff officers and commanders of the sub-units.  
Force protection of all units is also an important issue in a peace operation. 
Security equipment, such as detectors, x-ray devices, armored vehicles and narcotic-
                                                 
199 Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”, Briefing paper 
presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21. 
71 
 
detecting dogs are some of the essential equipment and assets to ensure the security 
and force protection.200  
Logistics is an important problem in peace operations, particularly in a 
country where there is no host nation support, and the transportation must be made 
by air because of the security and infrastructure reasons such as in Afghanistan. 
Because of perfect planning during Turkey’s leadership, there was no problem with 
logistics support. Turkey managed to support all ISAF units very well with food and 
water, fuel and other items. It was an economic way to provide food and water from 
the “Supreme Food Service Company” and fuel from the “Shell Pakistan Fuel 
Company” instead of bringing them from Turkey.201 
The UN Security Council resolutions on ISAF called for a trust fund to be 
established for common expenses. Actually, such a fund was necessary, but no 
contributions have been made to this fund. The lead nations therefore had to meet the 
bulk of ISAF’s substantial costs by herself.202 The UN should take measures that are 
more efficient to ensure that the member countries contribute to such kind of funds 
for peace operations. By this way, the financial burden of the lead nation can be 
reduced and the number of countries who will contribute can be increased. The 
heavier international presence in peace operations, the greater the likelihood of 
credible results.  
Well-established communication systems have an important role and assist 
the success of peace operations. Being aware of that, Turkey established an excellent 
communication and information system that won the appreciation of other countries. 
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Furthermore, the establishment of Turkish Telekom GSM and payphones were very 
effective in improving personnel’s morale and motivation. 
Selecting the specialized and experienced personnel for peace operation 
forces and preparing the troops for the operation are other key issues for success. 
Officers selected for the command functions should be culturally aware and 
sensitive, patient, adaptive and tolerant. While determining the Turkish personnel 
who would be assigned to ISAF, particularly to the important positions, priority was 
given to ones who had already experienced other peace operations. 
CIMIC operations are the main operations for the success of peace 
operations. They enable peacekeepers to win the hearts and minds of the host 
societies. While conducting CIMIC projects, working in close coordination with the 
UN agencies, NGOs and the local authorities is important. In this context, ISAF II 
conducted an extensive CIMIC program designed to provide assistance to the local 
community through carefully selected projects in close coordination with other 
organizations in Kabul. However, a common CIMIC fund would be useful. During 
Turkey’s leadership, ISAF did not have such a fund and some countries provided 
limited funds for CIMIC projects; therefore, Turkey had to finance most of ISAF’s 
assistance activities towards the local community.203  
Peace operations need an effective information capacity. This enables the 
Command to explain their purpose to the local population and prevent 
misinformation by providing a credible and correct source of information. Radio is 
the most effective instrument for this purpose. ISAF II information operations, 
including two radio stations, played an important role by informing local and 
international community about ISAF activities and incidents, which took place in 
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AOR of ISAF, on time and accurately, and prevented incorrect news production.  
During Turkey’s leadership, press briefings were held by the ISAF media officer 
everyday to inform public with correct information. Additionally, the Commander’s 
monthly press briefings provided suitable atmosphere for media to get first-hand 
information from the most authorized personnel.204 If media is not informed on time 
and accurately, they may produce incorrect stories depending on the false 
information they acquire. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The September 11 terrorist attacks affected the international community more 
than any other event in recent years and they made the collective struggle against 
terrorism the main issue for the world. The U.S. started a comprehensive war against 
terrorism with the support of many countries. NATO invoked Article V for the first 
time in its history.  
The first step was the war in Afghanistan. After the relationship between the 
attacks and Al Qaeda was discovered, the U.S. and Coalition Forces attacked the 
Taliban regime and Al Qaeda which was using Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. 
During this operation, the Taliban regime collapsed and Al Qaeda was heavily 
damaged. However, ensuring the future stability of a failed country would require 
leaving behind well-functioning national security institutions under the direction of a 
strong government. Capable security institutions would hinder terrorists trying to 
reenter the country and reestablish training bases there.205 Hence, it was necessary to 
create effective security institutions in Afghanistan. 
Consequently, an Interim Administration was established and a UN-mandated 
multinational force to assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its 
surrounding areas was called for creation at the Bonn Agreement. As a response to 
this request, the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 authorized the establishment 
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of ISAF to assist the Interim Administration and its successors in the maintenance of 
security in Kabul while the responsibility for providing security throughout 
Afghanistan resided with the Afghans themselves. Therefore, the Bonn Agreement 
and the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 formed the legal basis of ISAF. ISAF 
is not a UN mission; it is a “coalition of the willing” operation that has been 
deployed under the authorization of the UN Security Council.  As stated in 
Resolution 1386, the role of ISAF is to assist Afghan authorities, not to replace their 
role as the government or undertake their responsibility for security. There is not a 
fixed end date for ISAF. However, it may be expected to continue until the Bonn 
process is accomplished. 
NATO’s overtaking the command of ISAF was an important event because it 
was the Alliance’s first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Its leadership of 
ISAF has overcome the problem of a continual search for a new lead nation every six 
months. It also enabled smaller countries to play a stronger role within a 
multinational structure, increasing the chance of success for ISAF. Only after NATO 
assumed command did the expansion of ISAF become possible.  
As ISAF is still an ongoing operation, it is too early to conclude whether it is 
successful or not. Nevertheless, the progress achieved so far in the Bonn process has 
been satisfactory. Since the deployment of ISAF, there has been a visible 
improvement in Kabul. Crime rates have been reduced and life has returned to 
normal. Schools have reopened to both sexes; commercial life has been developing at 
a rapid pace; the people of Kabul have felt themselves confident; the night curfew 
has been lifted for the first time in 23 years. The elections in Afghanistan, which will 
be conducted at the end of the Bonn process, will be a great test for ISAF as well as 
other international efforts in Afghanistan. 
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After September 11, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight 
against terrorism. She, being a country suffered from terrorism for years, fully 
supported all activities to counter terrorism. Although she was not able to make a 
meaningful contribution in terms of financial and economic reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, she actively participated in ISAF from the beginning, and after Great 
Britain, took over the command of ISAF. 
In the eyes of allies, particularly the U.S. and the UK, Turkey was a perfect 
choice to lead ISAF. Turkey had an Islamic population with a secular and democratic 
government. She was one of the few countries whose forces were capable of coping 
with this kind of mission and her army has valuable experience in peace operations. 
Turkish society was a living example to the people of Afghanistan of a society that is 
both Muslim and progressive. It should also be understood that chances for success 
in peace operations increase when a strong state or coalition with well-armed, well-
trained troops takes the lead.206  
To assume the command of ISAF was also in the interest of Turkey. She 
wanted to demonstrate that she was an important actor in the international arena. The 
success would boost its profile both in the region and in the eyes of the international 
community. However, some concerns over the size, scope and cost of the mission 
caused Turkey to hesitate. After some promises were given considering her 
hesitation, she accepted command of ISAF. 
By assuming command of ISAF, Turkey has demonstrated her determination 
to fight against terrorism. Because of the deep rooted friendship between 
Afghanistan and Turkey, Afghan people felt secure with ISAF forces under the 
Turkish leadership. During Turkey’s leadership, stability and security in Kabul 
                                                 
206 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, “Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping 
in Afghanistan”, The Washington Quarterly, 26(1): 35-52. 
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improved gradually and the people of Kabul were very happy with ISAF’s activities. 
Under Turkey’s leadership, ISAF operated in good harmony. Turkey successfully 
performed its mission and Turkish officers’ professionalism in peace operations was 
underscored once more. 
There are several reasons for Turkey’s success: First, as members of a 
Muslim country, Turkish personnel knew about the Afghans’ customs to such an 
extent that they do not feel like aliens in Afghanistan. Broad cultural differences 
between military personnel and the local population would make it difficult to create 
an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Second, Turkey has traditionally had good 
relations with the Afghan nation. These relations go back to the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. Third, under the Turkish leadership, ISAF never became involved 
in Afghan domestic politics. Therefore, the Afghan people and officials trusted ISAF 
fully.  
Finally, it must be remembered that ISAF is more than a military force. It is a 
symbol of the international community’s determination to help Afghan people. It 
should also not be forgotten that peace operations cannot, in themselves, create 
democracy and state building; instead, they can create an environment that enables 
local actors to achieve their goals. Peace operations can sow the seeds of democracy, 
but the people should nurture these seeds. 
This study has not dealt with all the issues related with ISAF. A number of 
important questions have inevitably remained untouched. While preparing this thesis, 
I took note of them and would like to bring them to the attention of prospective 
researchers as listed below: 
• Is the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan legal in terms of international law? 
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• To what extent has the Bonn process been successful? Are the ongoing 
international efforts adequate to make Afghanistan a responsible member 
of the international community?  
• Which kind of peace operations are more efficient, UN peace operations or 
“coalition of the willing” operations under the leadership of a strong state? 
• To what extent is ISAF successful? What are the achievements and 
shortcomings of ISAF? Which lessons can be drawn from ISAF for future 
peace operations? (After its mandate came to an end.) 
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ANNEX I 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE209 
 
1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility 
for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the 
Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their 
means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United Nations and 
other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations 
deployed in Afghanistan. 
 
2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the 
international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment 
and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.  
 
3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed 
forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on 
Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the 
early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will 
assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a 
force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and 
other areas. 
 
4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military 
units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated 
force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist in the 
rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 Bonn Agreement (Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afgahnistan Pending The Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions), December 5, 2001, available at 
<www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/ talks/agreement.htm>. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT210 
Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim 
Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’). 
 
Preamble 
Referring to the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending 
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, signed in Bonn on 5 
December 2001, (‘Bonn Agreement’), The Interim Administration welcomes the 
provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386. 
The ISAF welcomes the Interim Administration’s commitment in the Bonn 
Agreement to co-operate with the international community in the fight against 
terrorism, drugs and organised crime and to respect international law and maintain 
peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the 
international community. 
 
Article I:  General Obligations 
1. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the Bonn Agreement 
requires a major contribution on its part and will make strenuous efforts to co-operate 
with the ISAF and with the international organisations and agencies which are 
assisting it.  
2. Interim Administration understands and agrees the Mission of the ISAF is to assist 
it in the maintenance of the security in the area of responsibility as defined below at 
Article I paragraph 4(g).  
3. The Interim Administration agrees to provide the ISAF with any information 
relevant to the security and safety of the ISAF mission, its personnel, equipment and 
locations. 
4. For the purposes of this Military Technical Agreement, the following expressions 
shall have the meaning described below: 
a. ‘The Parties’ are the Interim Administration and the ISAF. 
b. ‘ISAF’ includes all military personnel together with their aircraft, vehicles, 
armoured vehicles, stores, equipment, communications, ammunition, 
weapons and provisions as well as the civilian components of such forces, air 
and surface movement resources and their support services. 
c. The ‘Interim Administration’ is the organization as detailed in the Bonn 
Agreement.   
d. ‘Military Units’ includes all Afghan factions, armed representatives or 
personnel with a military capability, to include all mujahidin, armed forces, 
and armed groups, other than the 'Police Force' defined at paragraph 4e.  The 
                                                 
210 Military Technical Agreement, 4 January 2002, available at <http://www.operations.mod.uk/ 
isafmta.pdf>. 
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definition of ‘Military Units’ in this context does not include the ISAF, 
Coalition Forces or other recognized national military forces. 
e. The Interim Administration ‘Police Force’ means individuals who have 
been formally appointed as Police by the Interim Administration, are 
recognizable, and carry official identification.  The Police Force includes the 
national security police, the criminal police, the uniform police, the traffic 
police and the border police. 
f. ‘Host Nation Support’ (HNS) is the civil and military assistance rendered 
by the Interim Administration to the ISAF within Afghanistan. 
g. Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the area marked out on the map attached 
at Annex B. 
h. ‘Coalition Forces’ are those national military elements of the US-led 
international coalition prosecuting the ‘War on Terrorism’ within 
Afghanistan.  The ISAF is not part of the ‘Coalition Forces’. 
i. An ‘Offensive Action’ is any use of armed military force. 
j. Designated Barracks to be agreed between the parties and to be detailed at 
Annex C. 
5. It is understood and agreed that once the ISAF is established, its membership may 
change.  
 
Article II:  Status of the International Security Assistance Force 
1. The arrangements regarding the Status of the ISAF are at Annex A. 
 
Article III:  Provision of Security and Law and Order 
1. The Interim Administration recognizes that the provision of security and law and 
order is their responsibility.  This will include maintenance and support of a 
recognized Police Force operating in accordance with internationally recognized 
standards and Afghanistan law and with respect for internationally recognized human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking other measures as appropriate. 
2. The Interim Administration will ensure that all Afghan Military Units come under 
its command and control in accordance with the Bonn Agreement.  The Interim 
Administration agrees it will return all Military Units based in Kabul into designated 
barracks detailed at Annex C as soon as possible.  Such units will not leave those 
Barracks without the prior approval of the Interim Administration and notification to 
the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration.  
3. The Interim Administration will refrain from all Offensive Actions within the 
AOR.  
4. A Joint Co-ordinating Body (JCB) will meet on a regular basis.  The JCB will 
comprise of designated Interim Administration officials and senior ISAF 
representatives.  The purpose of the JCB will be to discuss current and forthcoming 
issues and to resolve any disputes that may arise. 
 
Article IV:  Deployment of the ISAF 
1. UNSCR 1386 authorizes the establishment for six months of an international force 
to assist the Interim Administration in the maintenance of security in the AOR. The 
Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF is the international 
force authorized by UNSCR 1386 and may be composed of ground, air and maritime 
units from the international community. 
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2. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will 
have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander 
judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF 
and its Mission. 
3. The Interim Administration understands and agrees the ISAF will have complete 
and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of 
Afghanistan. The ISAF will agree with the Interim Administration its use of any 
areas or facilities needed to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, 
training and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable.  
4. In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is 
authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and regulation of surface 
military traffic throughout the AOR.  
5. The ISAF will have the right to utilize such means and services as required to 
ensure its full ability to communicate and will have the right to the unrestricted use 
of all of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for this purpose.  In 
implementing this right, the ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate 
with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration. 
 
Article V:  Illustrative Tasks of the ISAF 
1. The ISAF will undertake a range of tasks in Kabul and surrounding areas in 
support of its Mission.  ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with 
and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration.   
Possible tasks, which may be undertaken jointly with Interim Administration Forces, 
will include protective patrolling. 
2. By mutual agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Interim 
Administration the ISAF may: 
a. Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures. 
b. Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction. 
c. Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan 
security forces. 
3. The ISAF will liaise with such political, social and religious leaders as necessary 
to ensure that religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan are 
appropriately respected by the ISAF. 
 
Article VI:  Identification 
1. ISAF personnel will wear uniforms and may carry arms if authorized by their 
orders. Police Force personnel, when on duty, will be visibly identified by uniform or 
other distinctive markings and may carry arms if authorized by the Interim 
Administration.  
 
Article VII:  Final Authority to Interpret 
1. The ISAF Commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this 
Military Technical Agreement.   
 
 
 
97 
 
Article VIII:  Summary 
1. The purposes of the obligations and responsibilities set out in this Arrangement are 
as follows: 
a. To provide the necessary support and technical arrangements for the ISAF 
to conduct its Mission.  
b. To outline the responsibilities of the Interim Administration in relation to 
the ISAF. 
 
Article IX:  Final Provisions 
1. Certified copies of this Military Technical Agreement will be supplied in Dari and 
Pashto language versions.  For the purposes of interpretation the English language 
version of this Military Technical Agreement is authoritative. 
 
Article X:  Entry into Force 
1. This agreement will enter into force upon signature by the Participants. 
 
 
 
Signed by  the Minister Of Interior, 
QANOUNI  
Signed By General McColl, 
COMISAF  
  
On behalf of the 
Interim Administration 
of Afghanistan 
Dated 
On behalf of the International 
Security Assistance Force 
 
Dated 
Witnessed by BG DE Kratzer 
for Lt Gen PT Mikolashek 
Coalition Forces Land Component 
Commander 
 
Dated 
 
 
 
 
Annexes: 
 
A. Arrangements Regarding the Status of the International Security Assistance 
Force. 
B. Map of Area of Responsibility.  
C. Designated Barracks.
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         ANNEX A  
 
ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE 
STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 
 
SECTION 1: JURISDICTION   
1. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis 
mutandis to the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison 
personnel. 
2. All ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, 
enjoying privileges and immunities under this Arrangement will respect the laws of 
Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with the UNSCR (1386) and will refrain 
from activities not compatible with the nature of the Mission.  
3. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will 
under all circumstances and at all times be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
their respective national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences 
which may be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan.  The Interim 
Administration will assist the ISAF contributing nations in the exercise of their 
respective jurisdictions.  
4. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will 
be immune from personal arrest or detention.  ISAF and supporting personnel, 
including associated liaison personnel, mistakenly arrested or detained will be 
immediately handed over to ISAF authorities.  The Interim Administration agree that 
ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may not be 
surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an international tribunal or 
any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation.  
ISAF Forces will respect the laws and culture of Afghanistan. 
SECTION 2: ENTRY INTO AND DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN 
5. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF and supporting 
personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may enter and depart Afghanistan 
with military identification and with collective movement and travel orders.  
6. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF will have the 
unimpeded right to enter Afghan airspace without seeking prior diplomatic clearance. 
SECTION 3: INDEMNIFICATION, CLAIMS AND LIABILITIES 
7. ISAF will be exempt from providing inventories or other routine customs 
documentation on personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and 
provisions entering and exiting or transiting Afghanistan territory in support of the 
International Security Force.  The Interim Administration will facilitate with all 
appropriate means all movements of personnel, vehicles, aircraft or supplies, airports 
or roads used.  Vehicles, vessels and aircraft used in support of the mission will not 
be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance. ISAF 
will use airports, roads without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges.  However, 
ISAF will not claim exemption from reasonable charges for services requested and 
received, but operations/movements and access will not be allowed to be impeded 
pending payment for such services.  
8. ISAF will be exempt from taxation by the Interim Administration on the salaries 
and emoluments and on any income received from outside the Interim 
Administration.  
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9. ISAF and their tangible movable property imported into or acquired in 
Afghanistan will be exempt from all identifiable taxes by the Interim Administration. 
10. The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to civilian or 
government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF Mission.  Claims 
for other damage or injury to Interim Administration personnel or property, or to 
private personnel or property will be submitted through Interim Administration to the 
ISAF.  
SECTION 4:  FORCE SUPPORT 
11. The ISAF will be allowed to import and export free of duty or other restriction, 
equipment, provisions and supplies necessary for the mission, provided such goods 
are for official use of ISAF or for sale via commissioners or canteens provided for 
ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel.  Goods sold 
will be solely for the use of ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated 
liaison personnel, and not transferable to other participants. 
12. The ISAF will be allowed to operate its own internal mail and 
Telecommunications services, including broadcast services, free of charge.  
13. The Interim Administration will provide free of cost, such facilities as the ISAF 
may need for the execution of the Mission.  The Interim Administration will assist 
the ISAF in obtaining at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities such as electricity, 
water and other resources necessary for the Mission. 
14. Nominated representatives of ISAF will be allowed to contract direct with 
suppliers for services and supplies in Afghanistan without payment of tax or duties.  
Such services and supplies will not be subject to sales or other taxes.  ISAF Forces 
may hire local personnel who will remain subject to local laws and regulation.  
However, local personnel hired by ISAF will: 
a. Be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and 
all acts performed by them in their official capacity. 
b. Be immune from National Service and/or national military service 
obligations. 
c. Be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by 
the ISAF.   
15. The Interim Administration will accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers 
licences and permits issued to ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated 
liaison personnel, by their respective national authorities. 
SECTION 5: MEDICAL AND DENTAL 
16. The Interim Administration will permit the importation and carriage of controlled 
drugs as required by ISAF and as officially issued to individual personnel. 
17. The Interim Administration will ensure that ISAF Forces and MEDEVAC 
aircraft, including helicopters, will be given the highest priority to transit to, within 
and from the relevant operation area and given unrestricted access to the airspace of 
Afghanistan to fulfill any emergency mission.  
SECTION 6: APPLICATION  
18. The protections hereby set out shall apply to the ISAF and all its personnel, and 
to forces in support of the ISAF and all their personnel. This will not derogate from 
additional protections, rights and exemptions other forces operating in connection 
with the ISAF may negotiate separately with the Interim Administration or the 
follow-on Government.  
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AO: KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING AREAS 
 
 
 
ANNEX B  
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ANNEX C  
TO THE MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT  
DATED 4 JAN 02 
 
LOCATION OF MILITARY BASES WITHIN KABUL AOR 
 
SER NAME & TYPE OF UNIT LOCATION COMMENT 
1.  055 LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION KHYER KHANA  
2.  315 TRANSPORT BRIGADE KHYER KHANA  
3.  10 ENGINEER DIVISION KHANJA BOGHRA  
4.  255 TANK BRIGADE KHANJA BOGHRA LOCATION ONE 
5.  219 TRANSPORT REGIMENT KHANJA BOGHRA  
6.  NATIONAL GUARD UNIT KHANJA BOGHRA  
7.  POLICE SUPPLY BASE KHANJA BOGHRA  
8.  2ND GUARD REGIMENT KHANJA RAWASH FIELD KABUL AIRPORT 
9.  AIRPORT PROTECTION BATTALION KHANJA RAWASH FIELD KABUL AIRPORT 
10.  AVIATION UNIVERSITY KHANJA RAWASH FIELD KABUL AIRPORT 
11.  22ND CITY PROTECTION REGIMENT SHARI NAO  
12.  717 ENZIBAT SUPERVISION DIVISION QALA-I-MARANJAN  
13.  52ND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION 1ST MICROROYAN  
14.  AIR DEFENCE UNIT 1ST MICROROYAN  
15.  AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT TATA-I-MARANJAN  
16.  NATIONAL GUARD BALA HISSAR  
17.  AIR DEFENCE UNIT BE BE MAHRO HILL  
18.  5TH TRANSPORTATION REGIMENT SEYA SANG  
19.  PROTECTION & COMMUNICATION BATTALION TELEVISION HILL  
20.  POLICE PROTECTION DIVISION MICROROYAN  
21.  101 SECURITY PROTECTION GARNESION  
22.  1ST GUARD REGIMENT PALACE (ARGE)  
23.  OPERATORY POLICE DIVISION DEHMAZANG  
24.  5
TH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MAIN 
OFFICE DARUL AMAN  
25.  235 UNIT DARUL AMAN  
26.  21 PROTECTION DIVISION DARUL AMAN  
27.  206 DETECTIVE UNIT PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN  
28.  205 DETECTIVE UNIT  DARUL AMAN  
29.  3RD GUARD REGIMENT TAJBEK HILL  
30.  313 ESCOT UNIT TAJBEK HILL  
31.  61 ZARBATE (SERIES) DIVISION  MAHTAB QALA  
32.  88 TOOY (T) REGIMENT DARUL AMAN  
33.  MILITARY SCHOOL (HARBE SHOWANZY) MATAB QALA  
34.  MUSIC BATTALION MATAB QALA  
35.  MILITARY UNIVERSITY (HARBE POHANTOON) PULLY CHAR KHI  
36.  TECHNICAL ACADEMY PULLY CHAR KHI  
37.  57 TRAINING DIVSION HOOD KHEL  
38.  CENTRAL ARMY REPAIR CENTRE HOOD KHEL  
39.  TECHNICAL SCHOOL (SHOWANZI-I-TEKHN) HOOD KHEL  
40.  SENIOR OFFICERS COURSE (KORSE-I-ALEE-I-AFSARAN) PULLY MAHMOD KHAN  
41.  SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF KABUL CITY AIRPORT BLOCKS  
42.  1ST INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
43.  2ND  INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
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44.  3RD  INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
45.  4TH  INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
46.  5TH   INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
47.  6TH  INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
48.  7TH  INTELLIGENCE OFFICE AIRPORT BLOCKS  
49.  8TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE KARTA-1-NAO  
50.  9TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE KARTA-1-NAO  
51.  10TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE KHYER KHANA  
52.  11TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE KHYER KHANA  
53.  12TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE ARZAN QEMAT  
54.  MILITARY FIREFIGHTING SECTION ASMAEE STREET  
55.  MILITARY WORKSHOP ASMAEE STREET  
56.  MILITARY MUSEUM DARUL AMAN  
57.  ACADEMY FOR MEDICAL SCIENCE BB BE MAHRO  
58.  MILITARY HEALTH CENTRE SHANI NAO  
59.  LOGISTICS INSTALLATION SHANI NAO  
60.  2ND MILITARY HOSPITAL PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN  
61.  MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN  
62.  MILITARY VEHICLE PARK MICROROYAN  
63.   SHASH DARAK  
64.  GARNISON HEADQUARTERS SHASH DARAK  
65.  4TH TANK PARKING DEPOT PULLY CHARKHY  
66.  10TH TANK PARKING DEPOT PULLY CHARKHY  
67.  RESERVIST TRAINING INSTITUTION PULLY CHARKHY  
68.  PRODUCTION DEPOT PULLY CHARKHY  
69.  MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX PULLY CHARKHY  
70.  10TH ENGINEERING COMPANY PULLY CHARKHY  
71.  MILITARY CLOTHING STORAGE DEPOT PULLY CHARKHY  
72.  STORAGE DEPOT PULLY CHARKHY  
73.  255 TANK BRIGADE  PULLY CHARKHY LOCATION TWO 
74.  4 AND 15 MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX PULLY CHARKHY  
75.  5TH TRANSPORT COMPANY KHANJA BOGHRA  
76.  704 COMPANY KHANJA BOGHRA  
77.  220 AVIATION COMPANY NORTH OF AIRPORT  
78.  TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INSTALLATION KHYER KHANA  
79.  MILITARY STORAGE DEPOT KHYER KHANA  
80.  FOOD STORAGE DEPOT KHYER KHANA  
81.  16TH TANK BATTALION OIL TANKS  
82.  1ST INFANTRY BATTALION KARGHA  
83.  MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUILDING  DARUL AMAN  
84.  DARUL AMAN PALACE BUILDING  DARUL AMAN  
85.  UNIT 195 T BUILDING DARUL AMAN  
86.  CENTRAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION BUILDING DARUL AMAN  
87.  MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE PULLY MICROROYAN  
88.  MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX QAMBER CROSS ROAD  
89.  MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX QAMBER CROSS ROAD  
90.  MILITARY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP SHARE POOR  
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